August 25–31: Fighting rages on in Hudaydah, Ta‘iz, Marib, and Shabwah

As another month of war comes to a close, a peaceful resolution to Yemen’s conflict is no closer. UN-backed talks in the Omani capital, Muscat, seem to be doomed to failure; a Scud missile, reportedly fired from Yemen’s capital towards the Saudi city of Jaizan, was seen as a sign of determination and a message of defiance from the Houth-Saleh alliance; a fresh battle is taking shape in al-Hudaydah; Houthis and their allies have regained more positions in Taʻiz; troops from the Saudi-led coalition, deployed recently in Marib, have already advanced on Shabwah and will return to the neighboring governorates of Marib and al-Jawf ahead of the expected Sanʻa battle, while a brigade involving at least 5000 troops from the Southern Popular Resistance in Aden city has been formed to take charge of the city’s security. At least eight cities have been hit by the airstrikes over the past week, where scores of civilians have reportedly been killed, while Houthi-Saleh units continued to intensify their cross-border attacks on Saudi army installations. The UN special envoy, currently based in Muscat, has been pushing for a political settlement since early last week, but the exiled government in Riyadh is sticking to its previous demand that the Houthis withdraw from occupied cities and hand over their arms prior to any further negotiations. The Houthis, however, warned they would carry out “a disastrous response” if the Muscat talks failed. On Wednesday, a Scud missile was fired from Sanʻa, targeting a power plant in the Saudi city of Jaizan.

In the western coastal governorate of al-Hudaydah, clashes erupted in the southern town of al-Durayhimi between tribal fighters from the Zaraniq tribe and Houthis as they were trying to send reinforcement to Taʻiz. Houthi forces seem poised to take control of the road to Taʻiz, where they have also retaken some western districts.

In the southeastern province of Shabwah, Apache helicopters were seen supporting the Saudi-led coalition forces that advanced to liberate the area late on Friday. Dozens of Houthis were reportedly killed. But in the neighboring governorate of Marib, fighting escalated over the weekend, with the Houthis gaining ground after reportedly using rockets and missiles in the battle.

 

United States Policy & Yemen's Armed Conflict

The Yemen Peace Project (YPP), in partnership with Resonate! Yemen and Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, has published a new report entitled United States Policy & Yemen’s Armed Conflict. The report examines the events leading up to the outbreak of the conflict in early 2015, assesses the successes and shortcomings of US foreign policy before and during the conflict, and presents realistic recommendations for a more peaceful and constructive American approach to Yemen’s crisis. The report focuses on five specific policy areas: diplomatic engagement, military intervention, humanitarian assistance, security and counterterrorism, and assistance to US citizens in Yemen, and it concludes with a set of additional recommendations for constructive US involvement in Yemen’s eventual post-conflict reconstruction effort. You can read the executive summary and priority recommendations below, and download the full report here (PDF). النسخة العربية

Executive Summary

In March of this year, long-simmering regional and political tensions exploded into a full-fledged armed conflict in Yemen, with the Houthi movement and military forces loyal to former president ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh fighting for control of the country’s major cities and key provinces. Arrayed against the Houthi-Saleh alliance are local militias allied with President ‘Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and his government-in-exile, a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, armed elements of the Southern Movement (al-Hirak), army units tied to General ‘Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar and the Islah Party, several powerful tribes, and an assortment of salafi and jihadi factions.

To date, more than 4,300 Yemenis have been killed in this conflict; at least half of these have been civilians. More than 1.4 million civilians have been forced to flee their homes. Most of the civilian casualties are the result of illegal indiscriminate attacks, carried out by both the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi-Saleh alliance.

Although the United States has not committed combat forces to the conflict, it is playing an important role. On the diplomatic front, the United States has played an important and laudable role in working to bring the warring parties to the table. The Obama administration must now work with Yemen’s neighbors and the rest of the international community to establish secure routes for the delivery of humanitarian aid, push for an end to hostilities, reach an internationally-supported political settlement, and build a comprehensive material and economic reconstruction plan. The US must also work with other members of the United Nations Security Council, which has been circumvented by the Saudi-led coalition, to ensure that any further military intervention in Yemen complies with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

In contrast to its constructive diplomatic efforts, many of the US administration’s other activities and policies are contributing to the perpetuation of the conflict and the destabilization of Yemen. US military and intelligence personnel are supporting the Saudi-led coalition’s ongoing campaign of aerial bombardment, which has violated international humanitarian law by deliberately targeting civilian residences and infrastructure, and by failing to protect civilians from harm.

The United States has also continued to carry out its own airstrikes against suspected members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), killing at least 76 people in 2015. US counterterrorism efforts in Yemen have long attracted criticism for their emphasis on “kinetic” tactics—missile strikes and armed assaults on AQAP targets—rather than programs that address the causes and facilitating factors of extremism and violence. As the balance of power within Yemen changes, US strikes risk further destabilizing the situation, and contributing to militant groups’ recruitment efforts.

Yemen was already facing a humanitarian emergency before the present conflict broke out. Today the country is in the midst of a full-blown catastrophe. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), more than 80% of Yemen’s population is in need of some form of assistance. Millions of Yemenis are suffering from food insecurity and a lack of clean water; famine is just around the corner. Meanwhile, Yemen’s health care system has collapsed, and thousands of Yemenis are dying for lack of access to medicine and treatment. The UN’s emergency appeal for Yemen is only 18% funded. Early in the conflict Saudi Arabia pledged to cover the entirety of the previous appeal; none of the promised funds have been delivered. Both the coalition and the Houthi-Saleh alliance are preventing aid from reaching civilians, in violation of international law. Despite the presence of several US warships in the Gulf of Aden, the US has failed to assist in the evacuation of US citizens and other foreign nationals from Yemen, as required by a recent UNSC resolution.

Priority Recommendations

Diplomatic engagement:

  • The US must urge Saudi Arabia and its allies to end their military intervention, and insist that any further international involvement in the conflict adhere to the restrictions of the UN Charter and international law. The US should push for a new UNSC resolution to that end.
  • The US must work toward the inclusion of all parties and factions, including nonstate fighting groups, in the peace process. The participation of such groups in negotiations is essential to a lasting peace.
  • The US must actively engage with regional actors outside the GCC—most importantly Iran—and with other global powers, with the aims of discouraging proxy support for factions in Yemen’s internal conflicts and creating a regional and international structure of support for an eventual peace agreement.

 Military intervention:

  • The US must immediately suspend its logistical and technical support for Saudi and coalition airstrikes, which do not meet legal standards regarding the protection of civilians or distinction between combatants and noncombatants, and halt any pending transfers of ordnance or other materiel to coalition states.
  • The US must take all measures at its disposal to discourage unlawful attacks against Yemeni civilians, or military actions which place civilians at undue risk.

Humanitarian assistance:

  • The US must act immediately to fund the UN’s humanitarian response plan, and to help establish safe routes for the delivery of aid.
  • The US must urge Saudi Arabia to deliver the funds it has already pledged for humanitarian assistance, and allow UNOCHA to determine where and how those funds are used.
  • The US must urge the Houthi-Saleh alliance, as well as the Saudi-led coalition, to allow the free passage and distribution of humanitarian assistance.

Security and counterterrorism:

  • The United States must suspend its targeted killing program immediately, and put in place a system to evaluate the program’s effectiveness, as well as the potential effectiveness of alternative, non-kinetic programs.
  • The White House, intelligence community, Department of State, and Department of Defense must establish a counterterrorism strategy prioritizing non-military solutions to long-term challenges.
  • The Department of Defense must evaluate the effectiveness of past military aid to Yemen, and tie any future assistance to real institutional reforms.

Assistance to US citizens:

  • State Department and military officials must take all possible measures to ensure the safe evacuation of any remaining US citizens who wish to leave the country, and ensure that citizens and their family members who have left Yemen already—many of whom are now in Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, or elsewhere in the region—are quickly and safely transported to the US.

Additional recommendations are included in the Policy Assessment and Recommendations section of the full report.


سياسة الولايات المتحدة والصراع المسلح في اليمن

ملخص تنفيذي

في أواخر شهر مارس من هذا العام، أفضى التوتر السياسي الإقليمي المتأجج مُنذُ فترة طويلة إلى صراع مسلح شامل في اليمن ضد حركة الحوثيين والقوات المسلحة الموالية للرئيس السابق علي عبدالله صالح الذين يقاتلون في سبيل السيطرة على المدن الرئيسية والأقاليم الأهم في البلاد. وفي مواجهة تحالف الحوثي وصالح تشكل تحالف عربي بقيادة المملكة العربية السعودية ودولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة وعناصر مسلحة أخرى موالية للرئيس الحالي عبدربه منصور هادي وحكومته في الخارج، من الحراك الجنوبي ووحدات مسلحة تنتمي لحزب الإصلاح والجنرال علي محسن الأحمر وعديد القبائل ذات النفوذ وكذا جماعات متنوعة أخرى من فصائل السلفيين والجهاديين.

وحتى الآن، قُتل أكثر من 4,300 يمني في هذا الصراع ، نصفهم على الأقل من المدنيين؛ كما نزح أكثر من 1.4 مليون مواطن. وتعود الإصابات بين المواطنين إلى الهجمات غير القانونية التي لا تفرق بين المقاتلين والمدنيين و المُنفذة من طرفي الصراع، سواءً التحالف العربي أو تحالف الحوثي وصالح. وبالرغم من عدم التزام الولايات المتحدة بأي قوات مقاتلة في هذا الصراع، إلا أنها تعلب دوراً محورياً فيه. وعلى الصعيد الدوبلوماسي، لعبت الولايات المتحدة دوراً هاماً وواضحاً في إعادة أطراف الصراع إلى طاولة الحوار. وعليه، فإن على حكومة أوباما أن تعمل مع دول الجوار في اليمن وبقية المجتمع الدولي من أجل تأمين طرق إيصال المساعدات الإنسانية، وإنهاء الصراع، والتوصل إلى تسوية سياسية بدعم دولي، وكذا وضع خطة إعادة إعمار مادية واقتصادية شاملة. كما يتوجب على الولايات المتحدة أن تعمل مع الدول الأعضاء في مجلس الأمن للأمم المتحدة، الذي تجاوزه التحالف العربي بقيادة السعودية، على ضمان أن أي تدخل عسكري آخر في اليمن سيكون وفقاً للفصل السابع في ميثاق الأمم المتحدة. وفي تناقض مع الجهود الدبلوماسية البناءة، تُساهم العديد من أنشطة وسياسات الإدارة الأمريكية في استمرار الصراع وزعزعة الأمن في اليمن. حيث تدعم الدوائر العسكري والاستخباراتية للولايات المتحدة الضربات الجوية التي يُنفذها التحالف العربي بقيادة السعودية في الوقت الراهن، والتي ارتكبت العديد من الاختراقات للقانون الإنساني الدولي عبر الاستهداف المتعمد للأحياء السكنية والبنى التحتية المدنية وكذا فشلها في حماية المدنين.

في حين استمرت الولايات المتحدة في تنفيذ ضرباتها الصاروخية ضد أعضاء مشتبهين من تنظيم القاعدة قُتل خلالها ما لا يقل عن 76 شخص في العام 2015 م، ولطالما جذبت جهود الولايات المتحدة لمكافحة الإرهاب في اليمن انتقادات لتركيزها على التكتيكات "الحركية" (“kinetic” tactics ) للضربات الصاروخية والهجمات المسلحة على مواقع القاعدة بدلاً من التركيز على البرامج التي تعالج الأسباب والعوامل المؤدية إلى التطرف والعنف. ونتيجة لتغير توازن القوى داخل اليمن، فإن الضربات الأمريكية قد تساهم في زعزعة استقرار الوضع وزيادة التجنيد في صفوف الجماعات المسلحة.وقبل إندلاع الصراع الراهن، كانت اليمن تواجه وضع إنساني حرج، الأمر الذي ترتب عليه حدوث كارثة إنسانية كبيرة في الوقت الحالي. ووفقاً لمكتب منسقية الأمم المتحدة للشئون الإنسانية (UNOCHA) فإن أكثر من 80% من إجمالي سكان اليمن في حاجة لشكل من أشكال المساعدة الإنسانية، ويعاني ملايين اليمنيين من إنعدام الأمن الغذائي والحاجة للمياة النظيفة؛ وتبدو البلاد على حافة الوقوع في مجاعة. في حين شهد النظام الصحي في اليمن إنهيار واضح، فإن آلاف اليمنيين يموتون بسبب القصور في تقديم الخدمات الطبية والعلاجية. كما أن نداء الطوارئ الذي قدمته الأمم المتحدة بخصوص دعم خطة الاستجابة الإنسانية في اليمن لم يتم تمويل سوى 18% منه. وفي بداية هذا الصراع تعهدت المملكة العربية السعودية بتغطية الخطة بشكل كامل؛ إلا أنها لم توفِ بذلك حتى الآن. بينما يعيق كلاً من التحالف العربي وتحالف الحوثي وصالح إيصال المساعدات الإنسانية للمدنيين في اختراق واضح للقانون الإنساني الدولي. وبالرغم من تواجد عدة سفن حربية تابعة للولايات المتحدة في خليج عدن، فشلت الولايات المتحدة في إخلاء المواطنين الأمريكيين والجنسيات الأخرى من اليمن، كما هو مطلوب في قرار مجلس الأمن الأخير.

توصيات متعلقة بالأولويات

التعامل الدبلوماسي: • على الولايات المتحدة حث المملكة العربية السعودية وحلفائها على إنهاء التدخل العسكري، والإصرار على أن يخضع أي تدخل دولي مستقبلي في اليمن لقيود القانون الدولي في ميثاق الأمم المتحدة. وعليه يتوجب على الولايات المتحدة أن تدفع نحو صياغة قرار صادر عن مجلس الأمن بهذا المحتوى. • على الولايات المتحدة أن تعمل على إشراك كل الأحزاب والفصائل، بما فيها من جماعات مقاتلة غير حكومية، في عملية السلام. إن مشاركة كل هذه الجماعات في المفاوضات أمر محوري من أجل بناء سلام دائم. • على الولايات المتحدة أن تعمل بشكل فعال مع اللاعبين الإقليميين خارج دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي، إيران على وجه الخصوص، والقوى الدولية الأخرى للحد من تغذية أطراف الصراع الداخلي في اليمن والسعي لإيجاد إطار إقليمي ودولي يفضي إلى إتفاق سلمي نهائي.

التدخل العسكري: • على الولايات المتحدة تعليق دعمها الفني واللوجستي لضربات التحالف العربي الجوية التي لا تتوافق مع المعايير القانونية فيما يخص حماية المدنيين أو التمييز بين الأفراد المحاربين من غيرهم، وإيقاف أي تحويلات معلقة من الذخائر أو المواد الأخرى لدول التحالف. • على الولايات المتحدة أن تتخذ جميع التدابير المتاحة لديها للحد من الهجمات غير القانونية ضد المدنيين اليمنيين، أو الأعمال العسكرية التي تعرض المدنيين لخطر لا مبرر له.

المساعدة الإنسانية: • على الولايات المتحدة أن تعمل فورا على تمويل خطة الاستجابة الإنسانية للأمم المتحدة، والمساعدة في تأمين طرق إيصال المساعدات الإنسانية. • على الولايات المتحدة حث المملكة العربية السعودية على الإيفاء بما تعهدت به من تمويل لخطة الاستجابة الإنسانية، والسماح لمنسقية الأمم المتحدة للشئون الإنسانية (UNOCHA) بتحدد كيف وأين يستخدم هذا التمويل. • على الولايات المتحدة حث تحالف الحوثي وصالح، والتحالف العربي أيضاً، على تأمين ممر حر والسماح بتوزيع المساعدات الإنسانية.

الأمن ومكافحة الإرهاب: • ينبغي على الولايات المتحدة تعليق برنامجها "القتل المستهدف"" targeted killing" على الفور، ووضع نظاماً لتقييم فعالية البرنامج، فضلا عن الفعالية المحتملة من البرامج البديلة، برامج"غير الحركية""“non-kinetic. • يتعين على البيت الأبيض، ومجتمع الاستخبارات، وزارة الخارجية، وزارة الدفاع وضع استراتيجية لمكافحة الإرهاب وإعطاء الأولوية للحلول غير العسكرية للتحديات طويلة المدى. • ينبغي على وزارة الدفاع تقييم فعالية المساعدات العسكرية السابقة لليمن، وربط أي مساعدة مستقبلية بإصلاحات مؤسسية حقيقية.

مساعدة مواطني الولايات المتحدة: • ينبغي على وزارة الخارجية والمسئولين العسكريين اتخاذ جميع التدابير الممكنة لضمان الإخلاء الآمن لأي من مواطني الولايات المتحدة المتبقين والراغبون في مغادرة البلاد، وضمان نقلهم وأفراد أسرهم الذين غادروا اليمن سابقاً، والذين لا يزالون حتى الآن في جيبوتي أو مصر أو في أي مكان آخر في المنطقة، على وجه السرعة وبشكل آمن إلى الولايات المتحدة.

تحميل التقرير الكامل

War's next major front takes shape in al-Hudaydah

The Red Sea coastal city of al-Hudaydah, in western Yemen, is bracing for a major battle, similar to the fight that occurred last month in Aden, as local resistance fighters and coalition forces drove out pro-Houthi troops. Earlier this month, a local group—calling itself the Tihamah Popular Resistance (TPR)—publicly stated that “it will soon start to liberate” al-Hudaydah Governorate from the Houthi presence. Headed by the former governor of al-Hudaydah, Sakhr al-Wajih, the TPR group indicated in a press statement on August 10 that its plan for the “final stage” of liberation has already been established and will be activated shortly. Saudi airstrikes have intensified in and around al-Hudaydah over the past week, a move seen as an attempt by the Saudis and their allies to support this local resistance group, as well as a prelude to deploying ground troops from the Saudi-led coalition’s own forces. But while the airstrikes aim at supporting the local resistance, they have also killed scores of civilians in the area. The airstrikes have also damaged the Hudaydah seaport—Yemen’s second-largest—closing a main import hub for aid supplies to the country’s north.

The TPR includes pro-Islah members and affiliates of the Peaceful Tihami Movement (al-Hirak al-Tihami al-Silmi), also referred to as the Tihami Hirak. The Movement emerged after Yemen’s 2011 popular uprisings, in response to a number of long-term local grievances. Since its inception the Movement has included members from a number of political parties and factions, united by their regional identity. At present the Tihami Hirak and the Islah Party share a common goal: the expulsion of pro-Houthi forces.

The Houthis and their allies, in turn, have intensified their presence by erecting and manning more checkpoints in and around Hudaydah. Checkpoints with armored vehicles can be seen on several streets downtown, and on the roads leading to the neighboring governorates of Taʻiz to the south and Hajjah to the north.

Al-Hudaydah is believed to be of great importance to the Houthis as “it provides them with means of access to cities like Taʻiz, Ibb and Aden,” where resistance fighters have recently gained ground, according to local analyst Alallah Sumam. “It is also a rich source of earnings and supplies through the second largest seaport in the country,” he added.

But most of the local people live below the poverty line, and are struggling to make a living amid the catastrophic situation. Months of airstrikes and low-intensity ground fighting, in addition to the blockade imposed on all the country’s ports, has taken its toll.

“We don’t need fighting [in Hudaydah]; we don’t want to suffer like the Adeni people,” Ahmed Hassan, a 35-year-old local resident who works on motorcycle to make a living for his family, told the YPP. “We are suffering already from the fuel shortages and electricity outages in this heat-scorched city.”  In August the average daily temperature in al-Hudaydah is 91̊ F.

On October 14, 2014, the Houthis entered Hudaydah and seized the main government buildings, over three weeks after they captured the capital, Sanʻa. Three days after they entered the city, a small group of fighters from the Tihami Hirak took up arms to fend off the Houthis when they attempted to capture the Hudaydah Castle, which the Hirak has used as a base since 2012. But the Houthis  swept Hirak members out of their bastion in a matter of hours. Although Hirak fighters have tried to regain the castle, they have each time either driven away or held captives in it.

Since then, the Houthis have maintained a firm hold on the city, while the resistance fighters, who have limited weapons, have been struggling to force them out. According to several observers in al-Hudaydah, the Houthis far outstrip the resistance fighters militarily.

“They grabbed heavy and medium weapons from several depots of military bases in Amran and Sanʻa before they entered Hudaydah,” political analyst and lawyer Ahmed Buraih said in an interview. Buraih also indicated that the Houthis have captured weapons from bases of the land and naval forces in al-Hudaydah since their arrival.

Over the past six months, the Hudaydah resistance has resorted to the hit-and-run approach, while covertly mobilizing more fighters. Resistance fighters have, every now and then, pounced on Houthi checkpoints and trucks in and around Hudaydah, through roadside attacks. Local anti-Houthi activists, however, have often criticized such an approach, which they say echoes al-Qaeda’s tactics.

The Houthis have responded by arresting pro-Islah figures and members of the Tihami Movement as well as local activists and journalists. During the last week, more than a dozen leading members of Islah were abducted in al-Hudaydah, according to an insider and eyewitnesses.

Soon after the TPR statement was issued, resistance fighters increased their attacks in al-Hudaydah Governorate, as the Saudi-led coalition intensified air and naval strikes. Just four days after the statement’s release, Coalition warships bombed pro-Houthi artillery bases in al-Durayhimi town to the south of Hudaydah city, on the road to Taʻiz. Clashes have sporadically taken place outside the town and in other areas nearby.

On August 12, Houthi figure Taha al-Mutawakkil was killed along with his driver in an ambush by resistance fighters to the east of Hudaydah, as they were coming from Sanʻa. Al- Mutawakkil was the Imam of Hashush mosque in Sanʻa, which was attacked in April by the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed group in Yemen.

On August 18, resistance fighters attacked two trucks carrying Houthis in Hudaydah city, while another truck was attacked in Bajil town to east of the city. Several Houthis were reportedly killed and wounded. Meanwhile, fighters fired rockets on a Houthi checkpoint to the south of al-Hudaydah. Four Houthis were killed while five others were injured.

On August 23, resistance fighters attacked a Houthi checkpoint some 45 km north of the city on the road to the town of Haradh in Hajjah, killing three and wounding four others.

On August 25, clashes between resistance fighters and Houthis resumed near the towns of al-Durayhimi and Bayt al-Faqih on the southern road to Taʻiz, as coalition airstrikes provided cover for the resistance.

A local source said that the Houthis were using the road to send reinforcement to Taʻiz, where Houthis and their allies seem to have retaken a number of positions. “But tribal fighters from the Zaraniq tribe, headed by Shaykh Yahya Munassir, intercepted them and clashes ensued,” said the source, who asked to remain anonymous, fearing reprisal.

August 18–24: Conflict escalates in al-Hudaydah, Ta‘iz, and Marib

The last week has seen some of the most brutal days of war in the poorest of the Arab states. Despite the UN and aid agencies warnings of eminent famine, Yemen’s conflict and associated humanitarian disaster are no closer to resolution. The Saudi-led airstrikes have been intensified, killing dozens of civilians; fighting has returned to areas of the country the coalition had claimed to have “liberated”; more coalition forces were deployed; al-Qaeda carried out brazen attacks in southern Yemen, while the Islamic State carried its first attack in the east; cross-border attacks by pro-Houthi/Saleh units have escalated as well. The UN-backed political talks in Oman seemed to have come to a standstill on Friday. But two days later, the UN Envoy resumed the talks after he met the exiled president in Riyadh, who tendered on Thursday a proposal to the UNSC chief for a conditional 15-day ceasefire. On the other hand, the head of the Houthi “Revolutionary Committee” sent a letter on Saturday, urging the UNSC to stop the Saudi-led war against Yemen, where the humanitarian situation has become more catastrophic.

UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Stephen O’Brien said Wednesday that the scale of human suffering in Yemen was “almost incomprehensible,” with a “shocking” four out of five Yemenis requiring humanitarian assistance and nearly 1.5 million people internally displaced. For its part, WFP estimates that the number of food insecure people in Yemen is now close to 13 million, including 6 million who are severely food insecure and in urgent need of external assistance; that is 20% of the country’s population.

Meanwhile, the Saudi airstrikes have escalated. In three consecutive days, coalition warplanes killed at least 80 civilians. On Tuesday, 21 educators were killed as they were in a meeting discussing the examinations process for schools. On Wednesday, at least 13 people were killed when four airstrikes hit a local market in al-Dhahi town to the north of al-Hudaydah. On the same day, the Hudaydah seaport was knocked out by at least eight airstrikes. On Thursday, 65 civilians were killed in Taʻiz.

Clashes raged on inTaʻiz and Abyan, as the coalition deployed ground troops. On Sunday, the coalition deployed thousands of troops with heavy armaments in the eastern province of Marib.

Across Yemen’s northern border, the pro-Houthi/Saleh units have intensively been shelling Saudi military bases in both cities of Najran and Jaizan. On Thursday, a ballistic short-range missile was fired against a naval base in Jaizan. The units have also pushed inland and killed a brigade commander in Jaizan.

Taking the advantage of months-long chaos, al-Qaeda in the south has reportedly seized areas in the port city of Aden [editor’s note: reports on this situation have been the subject of controversy. Here’s another take, as reported in the New York Times]. The Islamic State’s self-proclaimed group in Yemen claimed its responsibility for attacking a military post in the eastern province of Hadramout.

Cooperation between Jihadis and Resistance raises questions for the South's future

We're pleased to present another guest post by a contributor we've featured on this blog twice beforeThe author, who is posting anonymously for professional reasons, is a resident of ‘Aden. I have edited the English version of this post for clarity. Our guest posts do not necessarily reflect the positions of the YPP. On July 17, Yemeni Vice President and Prime Minister of the government in exile, Khaled Bahah, announced the “liberation” of Aden from the control of Ansar Allah and the elements of Yemen’s armed forces loyal to former president ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh (mainly the former Central Security Forces and Republican guard).   

There is another side to the truth, neglected in official announcements but visible in reports from the ground. Behind the successful defense of Aden from pro-Saleh/Houthi forces was a collection of three kinds of active armed groups: youth inspired by the Southern independence movement (al-Hirak), Safali militants, and members of Ansar al-Shariʻah (AAS) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) [editor’s note: some observers and foreign governments consider Ansar al-Shariʻah to be an alias or subsidiary of AQAP, but others insist that the two organizations maintain distinct identities.].

Each of these groups has its own headquarters and training sites. One fighter who was active on the Salah al-Din front in al-Burayqah Directorate of Aden said, “I don’t understand why the local media neglected to credit Ansar al-Shariʻah and al-Qaeda with the victory in Ras ‘Amran [Village, west of al-Burayqah]. This is not fair!”

The important role of AAS, AQAP, and the Salafi militias are well known to local leaders, media, and civilians, but most avoid speaking about this openly, in order to avoid confusion or disagreements which could harm the fight against the Houthi/Saleh forces. It is also commonly known that one of the prominent commanders of the local resistance who was killed during the liberation of Ras ‘Amran, Muhammad Harbaj, was a member of AAS.

Forces loyal to Yemen’s legitimate government [i.e. President Hadi’s government in exile] have been the weakest link in Aden. Though these forces have indeed participated in battles on all fronts, they are less prepared and less well-trained than other militias. One example of this is the pro-Hadi forces’ failure to properly take advantage of weapons air-dropped in Aden by the Saudi-led coalition. The reason for this failure is that these forces, like the Hiraki youth and Salafi militias, lack the experience and knowledge to properly use and maintain the American-made weapons provided. AAS and AQAP were better prepared to use such weapons, given their groups’ exposure to US weapons in Iraq and Afghanistan, while the other militias are only familiar with Russian-style equipment.

The pro-Hadi forces also had less of a concrete reason to fight the Houthi-Saleh coalition. For example, Salafi militants sought revenge against the Houthis for the conflict in Dammaj [in Saʻdah, from which Ansar Allah forcibly expelled residents affiliated with a prominent Salafi institution]; AAS and AQAP are fighting to survive; Hiraki youth, for their part, are fighting for the cause of an independent Southern state. Pro-Hadi fighters, on the other hand, were encouraged to fight with promises of payments in Saudi Riyals and 40 liters of fuel from Aden’s refinery, which they could then sell on the black market.

The question of the moment is, what comes after the reconquest of Aden? Some of the most pressing concerns for Adenis include the reconstruction of roads, the restoration of electricity and water supplies, and the resettlement of the thousands of people who were displaced from the districts of Crater, Khor Maksar, al-Maʻala and al-Tawahi. Similar problems face the neighboring governorates of Lahj, al-Dhaliʻ, and Shabwah; there is also the matter of how authorities can compensate citizens affected by the conflict.

Perhaps even more important than these issues is the challenge of counterterrorism. Whatever authority comes to power in Aden will have to reckon with several armed Islamist groups, all of which have proved themselves in the battle for Aden, and all of which continue to be involved in the fight against the Houthi/Saleh forces.

For more on the uneasy alliance between AQAP and other Southern factions, read this piece by renowned Yemeni journalist Saeed al-Batati.

 

في تاريخ يوليو 17، 2015 اعلن نائب الرئيس و رئيس الوزراء اليمني "خالد بحاح" عن "تحرير عدن" من تقدم انصار الله المدعومة من القوات الموالية من الجيش (أمن مركزي و حرس جمهوري) للرئيس اليمني السابق علي عبدالله صالح.

للحقيقة جانب أخر من خلال المقال سنحاول التعرف عليه... يعود فضل عدم سقوط عدن بيد قوات تحالف انصار الله وصالح الى مزيج من مليشيات ثلاث مكونات فاعله بالوقت الحالي "شباب متأثر بأدبيات الحراك الجنوبي، السلفيين ، انصار الشريعة و القاعدة" جميعها تشاركت جبهات القتال ضد مد تحالف انصار الله  وصالح.

فكلاً من المليشيات الثلاث كانت لها غرفة العمليات الخاصة بها والتي منها تدريب مواقها في جبهات القتال، يتحدث احد المشاركين في جبهة قتال منطقة صلاح الدين التابعة لمديرية البريقة " استغرب عدم تناول الإعلام المحلي لحقيقة انتصار انصار الشريعة والقاعدة في جبهة عمران، إن ذلك غير منصف !".

رغم علم الكثير من الشخصيات الاجتماعية و وسائل الإعلام وحتى العامة من الناس للدور المهم الذي يلعبه انصار الشريعة و القاعدة بالإضافة إلى السلفيين إلا انهم يتجنبون الحديث صراحة الاعتراف بذلك الدور علناً تفادياً للتشويش الذي قد ينتج على المعارك ضد تقدم تحالف انصار الله وصالح. فقائد اللجان الشعبية لمنطقة صلاح الدين الذي قتل اثناء تحرير منطقة رأس عمران ويدعى "محمد حرباج" احد اعضاء انصار الشريعة في عدن.

القوات التابعة للشرعية في عدن هي "الحلقة الأضعف"، صحيح انها شاركت ايضاُ في جبهات القتال إلا ان جهودها ببقية المليشيات المسلحة المشاركة معها فإنها تعتبر الأقل جاهزية للقتال، فعلى سبيل المثال الاسلحة الامريكية التي قدمت من قبل قوات التحالف السعودي لإستخدامها ضد تقدم انصار اللخ و صالح لم يستفاد منها بالشكل الكافي ! والسبب يعود بأن القوات التابعة للشرعية بالإضافة إلى المليشية المتأثرة بأدبيات الحراك الجنوبي بالإضافة إلى السلفيين لا يملكون المعرفة الكافية لإستخدام ذلك العتاد العسكري الأمريكي خلاف انصار الشريعة و القاعدة الذين يملكون معرفة ممتازة بإستخدام العتاد العسكري الأمريكي والذي عدد من عناصر القاعدة تمكنت من إستخدامة في افغانستان و العراق. خلاف بقية المليشيات المسلحة التي تملك خبره جيدة بإستخدام العتاد العسكري الروسي فقط !

النقطة الأخرى، بقية المليشيات المسلحة التي قاتلك مع القوات التابعة للشرعية عندما قاتلك فإن اسبابها اكثر صلابها فعلى سبيل المثال السلفيين يقاتلون إنتقاماً "لحرب دماج" بينما انصار الشريعة والقاعدة التي تقاتل كي تبقى واخيراً المليشية المتأثرة بأدبيات الحراك الجنوبي فإن سبب قتالها إستعادة ما تعتقد انه إستعادة الدولة الجنوبية".

خلاف القوات التابعة للشرعية التي تقاتل لأجل مجموعة من الريالات السعودية و 40 لتر بترول ممنوح من مصافي عدن ليتم بيعة لاحقاً بالسوق السوداء !

السؤال المستحق في هذه اللحظة، ماذا بعد استعادة عدن !؟

إعادة إعمار عدن ويشمل ذلك البنية التحية من طرقات وكهرباء وماء ... و عودة النازحين الى بيوتهم التي تركوها في مديريات كريتر، خورمكسر، المعلا و التواهي.

بالإضافة إلى إعادة إعمار المحافظات الاخرى المتأثرة بالصراع المسلح كلحج، الضالع و شبوة وتعويض المواطنين عما فقدوه.

والأهم من ما سبق... قضايا مكافحة الإرهاب الذي بلا شك سيكون الملف الأبرز وهنا سيكون التحدي اكبر لأن الجماعات الاسلامية قد اثبتت وجودها في معركة عدن وماتزال تعيش نزوة الانتصار بعدما كانت سبب ايضاً في صمود واستعادة عدن !

August 3–17: Resistance takes much of Taʻiz, coalition pushes inland

Fighting in the southern part of Yemen has expanded over the past two weeks, as Southern Resistance, Emirati, and coalition forces have advanced inland from Aden to drive Houthi/Saleh forces out of adjacent governorates. Locals in and around Aden have discovered thousands of landmines planted by the pro-Houthi/Saleh forces before they were driven out of the area. Coalition-trained Yemeni fighters, along with Saudi and Emirati soldiers, have pushed further into Abyan province after they captured the largest military base in al-Anad of Lahj province along with other bases nearby. Three Emirati soldiers were killed after their armored vehicle was hit by a landmine. Over 100 civilians were reportedly killed by landmines in the south. Demining teams are working quickly to clear the mines where possible.

With fighter jets and Apache helicopters providing air cover for battle tanks and other armored vehicles, the resistance and its allies launched the Abyan offensive to liberate the province. After four days of clashes, the coalition reported that it had entirely regained Abyan. The have already advanced on the neighboring province of Shabwa. According to some reports, however, Ansar al-Shariʻah-affiliated fighters led by Jalal Bilʻaydi, who commanded the AAS takeover of Abyan in 2012, entered and took control of Zinjibar as soon as Houthi/Saleh forces left the city.

President Hadi in Riyadh has issued a decree, appointing governors for the “liberated” governorates of Lahj and Abyan. On the other hand, the Houthi “Revolutionary Committee” in Sanʻa appointed deputy governors for a number of governorates.

Moreover, at least 11 cities were hit by the Saudi-led airstrikes during the last week. On Sunday, scores of people were reportedly killed in Ibb, Amran and Taʻiz.

Dragging on for the fifth month now, the war has so far claimed the lives of more than 4000 people, while the humanitarian and health situation is increasingly disastrous. ICRC President Peter Mauer arrived in the capital to assess the situation in Yemen. Speaking to reporters on Sunday, Mauer said that the months-long blockades imposed on all the country’s ports have led to “overwhelming catastrophic situations.”

Meanwhile, clashes in several cities including Taiz, Ibb, Marib and Dhalea cities have also intensified. Resistance fighters have gained ground, while dozens of pro-Houthi/Saleh forces were reportedly killed in the three fronts. On Sunday the 16th, resistance forces in Taʻiz reported significant gains in that city.

Across the borderline, pro-Houthi/Saleh units have intensified their missile attacks over the past week, hitting several military bases in Najran and Jaizan cities. Backed by armed tribesmen, the units reportedly advanced on a base outside Najran, killing at least 16 soldiers. The Saudi army claimed to have successfully repelled this attack on Sunday.

Pro-Houthi tribal loyalists have been mobilized in several cities as a matter of supporting the so-called ‘strategic options’, to which the Houthi top leader has referred in his recent televised speech.

In Sanʻa, Houthis arrested several Islah-affiliated figures including women. Meanwhile, clashes in the northern district of Arhab have erupted between pro-Islah armed tribesmen and Houthi fighters, shortly after the security services were put on high alert in the capital. Three days later, IS group carried out a car bomb in the north of Sanʻa that resulted in no casualties.

Facing both fierce resistance and financial crisis, the Houthis sent delegates to the Omani capital, Muscat, to participate in the ongoing political talks with all Yemeni factions. However, the exiled Yemeni government in Riyadh has announced that an initiative shall be brokered in the upcoming days for resuming the long-stalled political process.

July 20–August 2: Another ceasefire fails

With intensified airstrikes, which have killed scores of civilians, along with relentless fighting over the southern port city of Aden, the situation in Yemen has escalated over the past two weeks in the face of continuing international calls for a ceasefire. On July 25, Saudi Arabia announced a unilateral humanitarian pause, scheduled to go into effect the following day, which Yemenis and international observers hoped would provide an opportunity for badly-needed aid to enter the country. This pause, however, was quickly broken by both Saudi-led airstrikes and ground combat, just two hours after it went into effect. Each side blamed the other for violating the respite, echoing the scenario seen on the first day of a previous humanitarian pause. Pro-Houthi/Saleh forces continued their attacks in Aden city, where they shelled the international airport and neighborhoods recently captured by the resistance. Likewise, Coalition airstrikes continued to pound the bases of those forces in Aden and elsewhere.

Just before announcing the planned ceasefire, Saudi planes bombed civilian residences in the Red Sea coast city of Mokha, killing at least 65 people in an attack that Human Rights Watch has called “an apparent war crime.”

In an attempt to “entirely liberate” Aden and advance into other cities, at least 3000 Coalition-trained Yemeni fighters have reportedly been deployed in Aden—one day after Vice President/PM Khaled Bahah briefly visited the city with six other ministers from the Hadi government in exile. The trip was seen as the first step toward restoring the government’s provisional capital. On the same day, President Hadi issued a decree appointing three new advisors. Hadi has also recently announced plans to unite all local resistance groups into the “national army,” a plan that will likely face resistance.

The leader of the Houthi Movement, ‘Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, made a televised speech on August 2, trying to justify his loss of Aden while continuing to defy the Saudi-led coalition.

Although Aden has been the epicenter of Yemen’s civil conflict, other areas including Lahj, Abyan, al-Baydha, Taʻiz and Marib have seen violent clashes between the pro-Houth/Saleh forces and the resistance fighters over the past week.

Missile attacks across the Saudi border have also continued. Pro-Houthi/Saleh units have recently fired tens of missiles at Najran and Jaizan cities, part of what they have described as “the strategic options.” A number of Saudi soldiers were reportedly killed and captured.

In the capital, Sanʻa, the self-proclaimed local chapter of the Islamic State (IS) has, for the first time, attacked a mosque frequented by members of the Isma’ili sect, commonly known as Bohrah, who are seen by some as supportive of Houthis. At least 10 people were killed and wounded.