UAE and Allied Forces Accused of Abuses in Aden

This is a consolidated version of three posts on the role of the United Arab Emirates in southern Yemen, by our guest blogger in Aden, who writes anonymously for professional reasons and safety concerns. The perspective of the author does not necessarily represent the positions of the YPP. The YPP has been able to independently verify some, but not all, of the claims reported herein. The YPP’s Hannah Porter assisted with editing and translation.

Mid-July marks the first anniversary of the battle to retake control of Aden from Ansarullah (Houthi) and Saleh forces. With military and financial support from the Saudi- and Emirati-led Arab coalition forces, a mix of Salafi militias, the Southern Resistance, mercenaries loyal to President Hadi, and members of Ansar al-Shariah/al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AAS/AQAP) formed a united front against the Houthis.

A year on, the United Arab Emirates continues to play a prominent role in South Yemen, particularly in Aden. The Emirati Red Crescent promotes a polished image of the UAE across the world and within Yemen by providing increased aid to the country.

Yet a different image—that of the UAE’s military role in South Yemen—is still incomplete. Apart from the military training, weapons, and armed vehicles that the Emirates provides to their southern agents, specifically to Aden’s governor Aidrus al-Zubaydi and security director Shalal Ali Shayae, there is another side to the story that journalists and activists don’t dare to touch, possibly because of Emirati support for their media outlets and humanitarian organizations, or because of the security crackdown by al-Zubaydi and Shayae.

The UAE has presented itself in southern Yemen as a global partner in the war on terror. Emirati forces oversaw the security crackdown last March in Aden’s al-Mansurah district and in al-Mukalla, the capital of Hadhramawt province, which was under AQAP control until recently. As a result of the Emirati-led offensive, AQAP chose to withdraw from Mukalla in April following consultations with respected local figures.

The security crackdown overseen by Emirati security forces, including a string of arrests of those with suspected ties to AQAP and the Islamic State group (IS), has been conducted outside the rule of law, according to some local observers. Emirati forces allegedly operate seven secret prisons in southern Yemen, where dozens of Yemenis have been tortured and forced to confess to being members of AQAP or IS.

A former detainee in one of the prisons said, “They allowed us to go to the bathroom once a day and did not allow us to pray. They forced me to write a false confession to being a member of al-Qaeda after subjecting me to agonizing torture.”

Many families do not know the fate of their sons who are being illegally detained in prisons under Hadi’s authority and those seven prisons run by the UAE. Thus far, international organizations and foreign powers have paid little attention to this aspect of Emirati involvement in Yemen. Given the immense scope of human rights violations being committed by all parties to Yemen’s conflict, the plight of these detainees will likely continue to be ignored.

It is fair to say that the United Arab Emirates has control over matters of security in Aden province, especially with the help of Aden’s governor Aidrus al-Zubaydi and head of security Shalal Ali Shayae. It appears, however, that Hadi’s government has recently been experiencing some tension with the forces controlling its temporary capital.

More than 2,000 Yemeni citizens from northern provinces working in Aden have been expelled with the help of UAE forces. Those carrying out the expulsions believe that northern Yemenis working in the South are either spies working for the Houthis and Saleh or saboteurs seeking to thwart future attempts at self-determination in South Yemen.

Despite clear orders from President Hadi and Prime Minister Ahmed bin Daghr instructing al-Zubaydi and Shayae to end the campaigns of deportation, the author witnessed deportations as recently as June 20.

Northern Yemenis who are arrested for the purpose of deportation are mainly thrown in the central prison in Aden’s district of al-Mansurah.

Yemen’s state judiciary is not functioning at all in this part of the country, so security and law enforcement, such as it is, is in the hands of local authorities and foreign forces. In Aden and other parts of the south, some of these functions are being carried out by local armed forces trained and equipped by the UAE.

In Aden alone there are four extrajudicial prisons run by the UAE, where dozens of Yemenis are tortured and forced to confess to being members of AQAP or IS. One is located behind Sha’ab City, near the residences of the UAE forces. Another is at the presidential palace in the area of Maashiq in Sirah (Crater) District. A third can be found at the coast guard camp in Khormaksar’s al-Arish District. The final prison is located in the Ras Abbas area in the district of Buriqah.

In Lahj province, UAE forces also keep detainees at al-Anad air force base. Some sources claim that another UAE-run detention facility exists on the island of Soqotra.

In Hadhramawt province, UAE forces use the Khalef area of Mukalla as a locale for one of their prisons. As a result of the many extrajudicial campaigns to arrest suspects in and around Mukalla, UAE forces and their local allies may open additional prisons as well.

Many of the Yemenis accused of being members of IS or al-Qaeda were arrested by units trained by UAE forces to conduct raids. These forces are not subject to Yemeni authorities nor are their operations approved by Yemen’s prosecution or courts, which have recently been inoperable.

Aden’s so-called Security Belt Forces are considered the most powerful security unit overseen and trained by the UAE, primarily carrying out orders issued by the commander of UAE forces in Aden to conduct raids and make arrests.

Mohamed Ba Rwis, a famous soccer player for Yemen’s national team and Aden’s al-Wahda club, was unlawfully arrested in July by Security Belt Forces during a raid of his home in al-Mansurah. He was taken to an unknown location, causing his family, friends, and Yemen’s soccer fans to fear for his safety.

Setting a dangerous precedent, the Security Belt Forces also arrested al-Mansurah’s deputy police chief Ayman Alibah and, according to a security source, detained him at one of the UAE-operated prisons in the district of Buriqah. The reason for his arrest is still unknown.

His detention certainly came as a shock to the heads of al-Mansurah’s police force and other security personnel in Aden. The incident also reveals the weak leadership of Aden’s head of security, Shalal Ali Shayae, and the extent of his loyalty to the UAE forces in the area.

These units have carried out dozens of similar arrests of Southern Resistance commanders, including the arrest in early June of Haleem al-Shuaibi, from the Hazm Salman Battalion, and commander Osan al-Kazimi in April.

Aden’s local newspaper, Al-Omanaa, published a statement by Southern Resistance commander Abu Mesh’al al-Dheb who said, “The most painful thing imaginable is to see our national sovereignty violated and to undergo investigation at the hands of foreigners on southern land.”

In the article, al-Dheb delivered an important message to whoever supports these arrests and raids: “Know that you cannot impose your will on a revolutionary people. They may tolerate it for a brief time, but they will absolutely not accept any prolongment or subordination.”

Aden's most powerful forces answer to UAE, not Hadi

This is the third of three posts on the role of the United Arab Emirates in southern Yemen, by our guest blogger in Aden, who writes anonymously for professional reasons and safety concerns. The perspective of the author does not necessarily represent the positions of the YPP. The YPP has been able to independently verify some, but not all, of the claims reported herein. The YPP’s Hannah Porter assisted with editing and translation. 

Many of the Yemenis accused of being members of IS or al-Qaeda were arrested by units trained by UAE forces to conduct raids. These forces are not subject to Yemeni authorities nor are their operations approved by Yemen’s prosecution or courts, which have recently been inoperable. 

Aden’s so-called Security Belt Forces are considered the most powerful security unit overseen and trained by the UAE, primarily carrying out orders issued by the commander of UAE forces in Aden to conduct raids and make arrests.

Mohamed Ba Rwis, a famous soccer player for Yemen’s national team and Aden’s al-Wahda club, was unlawfully arrested in July by Security Belt Forces during a raid of his home in al-Mansurah. He was taken to an unknown location, causing his family, friends, and Yemen’s soccer fans to fear for his safety.

Setting a dangerous precedent, the Security Belt Forces also arrested al-Mansurah’s deputy police chief Ayman Alibah and, according to a security source, detained him at one of the UAE-operated prisons in the district of Buriqah. The reason for his arrest is still unknown.

His detention certainly came as a shock to the heads of al-Mansurah’s police force and other security personnel in Aden. The incident also reveals the weak leadership of Aden’s head of security, Shalal Ali Shayae, and the extent of his loyalty to the UAE forces in the area.

These units have carried out dozens of similar arrests of Southern Resistance commanders, including the arrest in early June of Haleem al-Shuaibi, from the Hazm Salman Battalion, and commander Osan al-Kazimi in April.

Aden’s local newspaper, Al-Omanaa, published a statement by Southern Resistance commander Abu Mesh’al al-Dheb who said, “The most painful thing imaginable is to see our national sovereignty violated and to undergo investigation at the hands of foreigners on southern land.”

In the article, al-Dheb delivered an important message to whoever supports these arrests and raids: “Know that you cannot impose your will on a revolutionary people. They may tolerate it for a brief time, but they will absolutely not accept any prolongment or subordination.”

يتم القبض على الكثير منهم من خلال فرق دربت لعمليات المداهمات والاقتحامات تتبع القوات الاماراتية ولا تخضع للسلطات اليمنية ولا تستند الى إذن من النيابة والمحاكم التي جلها معطلة حتى هذه اللحظة.

وتعتبر قوات ما تسمى "الحزام الامني"، اهم الوحدات الامنية التي دربتها وتشرف عليها القوات الاماراتية وهي تنفذ بشكل رئيسي الاوامر التي تأتيها من قائد القوات الاماراتية الموجود في عدن للقيام بعمليات المداهمة والاعتقال.

محمد بارويس، لاعب كرة القدم الشهير في المنتخب اليمني. يلعب في صفوف نادي الوحدة في عدن. تعرض هو الاخر للأعتقال علي ايدي قوات الحزام الامني التي اقتحمت منزلة الواقع في مديرية المنصورة واقتاده الى مكان مجهول بعد ان اعتقلته خارج إطار القانون. مسببين في ذلك الخوف في اوساط اسرته ومحبيه من عشاق كرة القدم في اليمن.

هذا ليس كل شيء، فقوات الحزام الامني تعتبر اعلى سلطة امنية في محافظة عدن بسبب تبعيتها للقوات الاماراتية التي تتولى بدورها إدارة الملف الامني. ففي سابقة خطيره. اعتقلت تلك القوات نائب شرطة المنصورة، ايمن اللبه, اثناء تواجده في احد احياء مديرية المنصورة و زجت به بالسجن التابع للقوات الاماراتية في مديرية البريقة وفق مصدر خاص. وليس من الواضح حتى الان سبب الاعتقال.

دون شك، إن مثل هذا الاجراء يشكل صدمة لقيادة شرطة المنصورة وبقية الافراد المنتمين للأمن العام في عدن. وهو ايضاً يوضح ضعف قيادة الامن العام ممثلة باللواء شلال شائع و مدى ولائه للقوات الاماراتية المتواجدة في المدينة.

يذكر أن قوات الحزام الأمني نفذت عشرات الاعتقالات المشابهة بحق قادة ميدانين بالمقاومة الجنوبية كان آخرهم حليم الشعيبي القيادي بكتيبة حزم سلمان وقبله القيادي أوسان الكازمي.

وقد اوردت صحيفة الامناء، وهي صحيفة محلية تصدر في عدن تصريح لأحد قادة المقاومة الجنوبية اسمة ابو مشعل الذيب يقول فيه: قمة الالم هو عندما تنتهك السيادة الوطنية ويتم التحقيق مع الثوار على ارض جنوبية بأيدي خارجية.

وبحسب تعبير الصحيفة فإن القائد ابو مشعل الكازمي ارسل رسالة هامة إلى كل من يقفون وراء عمليات الاعتقالات والمداهمات التي طالت منازل قيادات المقاومة قائلاُ : ياهؤلاء عليكم أن تعلموا انه لايمكن فرض إملاءات على شعب ثائر قد يتقبل فترة مؤقتة لظروف هنا وهناك لكنه قطعآ لن يقبل أي تسويف او وصاية او خضوع.

Emirati forces run extrajudicial prisons across the South

This is the second of three posts on the role of the United Arab Emirates in southern Yemen, by our guest blogger in Aden, who writes anonymously for professional reasons and safety concerns. The perspective of the author does not necessarily represent the positions of the YPP. The YPP has been able to independently verify some, but not all, of the claims reported herein. The YPP’s Hannah Porter assisted with editing and translation.

It is fair to say that the United Arab Emirates has control over matters of security in Aden province, especially with the help of Aden’s governor Aidrus al-Zubaydi and head of security Shalal Ali Shayae. It appears, however, that Hadi’s government has recently been experiencing some tension with the forces controlling its temporary capital.

More than 2,000 Yemeni citizens from northern provinces working in Aden have been expelled with the help of UAE forces. Those carrying out the expulsions believe that northern Yemenis working in the South are either spies working for the Houthis and Saleh or saboteurs seeking to thwart future attempts at self-determination in South Yemen.

Despite clear orders from President Hadi and Prime Minister Ahmed bin Daghr instructing al-Zubaydi and Shayae to end the campaigns of deportation, the author witnessed deportations as recently as June 20.

Northern Yemenis who are arrested for the purpose of deportation are mainly thrown in the central prison in Aden’s district of al-Mansurah.

Yemen’s state judiciary is not functioning at all in this part of the country, so security and law enforcement, such as it is, is in the hands of local authorities and foreign forces. In Aden and other parts of the south, some of these functions are being carried out by local armed forces trained and equipped by the UAE.

In Aden alone there are four extrajudicial prisons run by the UAE, where dozens of Yemenis are tortured and forced to confess to being members of AQAP or IS. One is located behind Sha’ab City, near the residences of the UAE forces. Another is at the presidential palace in the area of Maashiq in Sirah (Crater) District. A third can be found at the coast guard camp in Khormaksar’s al-Arish District. The final prison is located in the Ras Abbas area in the district of Buriqah.

In Lahj province, UAE forces also keep detainees at al-Anad air force base. Some sources claim that another UAE-run detention facility exists on the island of Soqotra.

In Hadhramawt province, UAE forces use the Khalef area of Mukalla as a locale for one of their prisons. As a result of the many extrajudicial campaigns to arrest suspects in and around Mukalla, UAE forces and their local allies may open additional prisons as well.

 

لا ابالغ ان قلت ان الامارات تتولى ادارة الملف الامني في محافظة عدن على وجه التحديد بواسطة وكلائها في الداخل وهم محافظ عدن ومدير الامن. ويبدو ان الحكومة الموالية لهادي قد بدءت تشعر بالانزعاج مؤخراً.

اكثر من 2000 مواطن يمني ينتمون الى المحافظات الشمالية ويعملون في عدن قد تم ترحيلهم الى خارج المحافظة بدعم من القوات الاماراتية المتواجدة في المدينة. يعتقد القائمون على عمليات الترحيل بأن المواطنين المنتميين الى المحافظات الشمالية الذين يعملون بعدن هم إما جواسيس يتبعون قوات انصار الله وصالح، او جماعات تخريبية قد ينبع منها ردات فعل عكسية تجاه اي خطوات مستقبلية تتعلق بتقرير مصير جنوب اليمن.

وبالرغم من الاوامر الصريحة من رئيس الجمهورية اليمنية ورئيس الوزراء التي توجه محافظ عدن ومدير امنها بوقف حملات الترحيل إلا ان كاتب المقال شاهد بعينية احد عمليات الترحيل في تاريخ يونيو 20.

يزج بالمواطنين الشماليين الذين يتم القبض عليهم لغرض ترحيلهم بشكل رئيسي في سجن المنصورة المركزي، في مديرية المنصورة.

وفي ذات الملف الامني، تدير القوات الإماراتية سبعة سجون خارج إطار القانون في جنوب اليمن، يعذب فيها العشرات بشكل مهين وتُنتزع منهم اعترافات بالإكراه تفيد بأنهم أعضاء في تنظيمي القاعدة والدولة الاسلامية باليمن.

في عدن وحدها توجد اربعة سجون تديرها القوات الإماراتية. اول هذه السجون يقع خلف مدينة الشعب وهو قريب من مقر إقامة القوات الإماراتية. بينما يقع السجن الثاني الذي تديره القوات الإماراتية في القصر الرئاسي بمنطقة معاشيق في مديرية صيرة. اما السجن الثالث فيوجد في معسكر قوات خفر السواحل، منطقة العريش في مديرية خورمكسر. والسجن الرابع يقع في منطقة رأس عباس، مديرية البريقة.

 وفي محافظة لحج، تتخد القوات الأماراتية من قاعدة العند الجوية العسكرية سجن اخر تديرة بشكل سري.

وفي محافظة سقطرى ايضاً تتخد القوات الاماراتي موقعاً لأحد سجونها السرية.

وفي محافظة حضرموت، تتخد القوات الإماراتية من منطقة خلف في عاصمة المكلا مكاناً لأحد سجونها في اليمن. وهنا من المهم الحديث من ان نتيجه للحملات خارج إطار القانون الكبيرة تجاه الكثير من المشتبه بهم من سكان المكلا والمناطق القريبة منها. قد لجئت القوات الاماراتية لفتح سجون اخرى بشكل سري لم يسمح لي بالتعرف عليها حتى الان

يتم القبض على الكثير منهم من خلال فرق دربت لعمليات المداهمات والاقتحامات تتبع القوات الاماراتية ولا تخضع للسلطات اليمنية ولا تستند الى إذن من النيابة والمحاكم التي جلها معطلة حتى هذه اللحظة.

 

UAE abuses in the south receive little attention

We are pleased to feature another piece by our guest blogger in Aden, who writes anonymously for professional reasons and safety concerns. The perspective of the author does not necessarily represent the positions of the YPP. The YPP has not been able to independently verify the facts reported herein. The YPP’s Hannah Porter assisted with editing and translation.

Mid-July marks the first anniversary of the battle to retake control of Aden from Ansarullah (Houthi) and Saleh forces. With military and financial support from the Saudi- and Emirati-led Arab coalition forces, a mix of Salafi militias, the Southern Resistance, mercenaries loyal to President Hadi, and members of Ansar al-Shariah/al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AAS/AQAP) formed a united front against the Houthis.

A year on, the United Arab Emirates continues to play a prominent role in South Yemen, particularly in Aden. The Emirati Red Crescent promotes a polished image of the UAE across the world and within Yemen by providing increased aid to the country.

Yet a different image—that of the UAE’s military role in South Yemen—is still incomplete. Apart from the military training, weapons, and armed vehicles that the Emirates provides to their southern agents, specifically to Aden’s governor Aidrus al-Zubaydi and security director Shalal Ali Shayae, there is another side to the story that journalists and activists don’t dare to touch, possibly because of Emirati support for their media outlets and humanitarian organizations, or because of the security crackdown by al-Zubaydi and Shayae.

The UAE has presented itself in southern Yemen as a global partner in the war on terror. Emirati forces oversaw the security crackdown last March in Aden’s al-Mansurah district and in al-Mukalla, the capital of Hadhramawt province, which was under AQAP control until recently. As a result of the Emirati-led offensive, AQAP chose to withdraw from Mukalla in April following consultations with respected local figures.

The security crackdown overseen by Emirati security forces, including a string of arrests of those with suspected ties to AQAP and the Islamic State group (IS), has been conducted outside the rule of law, according to some local observers. Emirati forces allegedly operate seven secret prisons in southern Yemen, where dozens of Yemenis have been tortured and forced to confess to being members of AQAP or IS.

A former detainee in one of the prisons said, “They allowed us to go to the bathroom once a day and did not allow us to pray. They forced me to write a false confession to being a member of al-Qaeda after subjecting me to agonizing torture.”

Many families do not know the fate of their sons who are being illegally detained in prisons under Hadi’s authority and those seven prisons run by the UAE. Thus far, international organizations and foreign powers have paid little attention to this aspect of Emirati involvement in Yemen. Given the immense scope of human rights violations being committed by all parties to Yemen’s conflict, the plight of these detainees will likely continue to be ignored.

يصادف منتصف يوليو/تموز الذكرى السنوية لبدء معارك استعادة السيطرة على مدينة عدن من قوات أنصار الله/ صالح. مزيج من مليشيات سلفية، إلى جانب المقاومة الجنوبية، وقلة من المرتزقة المواليين للرئيس هادي بالإضافة الى أنصار الشريعة جميعهم شكلوا جبهة موحدة دعمت بالمال والسلاح من قوات التحالف العربي بقيادة شقيه السعودي والإماراتي.

لعبت الإمارات العربية المتحدة دورًا بارزًا في عدن وجنوب اليمن بشكل عام ولا تزال تلعب ذلك الدور حتى الآن. فالهلال الأحمر الإماراتي ما زال يغذي الصورة الساطعة للإمارات في أوساط المجتمع اليمني والعالم من خلال الدعم الغذائي المتنامي الذي يقدم لليمنيين.

بينما الدور العسكري للإمارات العربية المتحدة في جنوب اليمن لا يزال غير مكتمل الصورة. بعيدًا عن العربات والأسلحة والتدريب الذي تقدمة الإمارات العربية المتحدة لوكلائها في جنوب اليمن وعلى رأسهم محافظ عدن ومدير أمنها, ثمة دور آخر لا يقترب منه إعلاميو وحقوقيو جنوب اليمن ولا يريدون الكتابة عنه ربما للدعم الإماراتي لوسائلهم الإعلامية ومنظماتهم المدنية وربما أيضًا للقمع الأمني الذي يقوده كل من محافظ عدن و مدير أمنه.

أعلنت الإمارات العربية المتحدة للعالم أن دورها في جنوب اليمن يأتي ضمن الجهود العالمية لمحاربة الإرهاب. اشتباكات خفيفة أشرفت عليها القوات الاماراتية في المنصورة بعدن وأخرى في مدينة المكلا, عاصمة محافظة حضرموت كبرى المحافظات اليمنية شرقي البلاد, على إثرها اختار أنصار الشريعة الانسحاب طواعية استجابة لوساطة مجتمعية من شخصيات تحظى باحترام المجتمع في كلا المنطقتين.

إلا أن حملات الاعتقالات التي تشرف عليها القوات الإماراتية في جنوب اليمن تجاه المشتبه بانتمائهم لتنظيمي القاعدة وداعش تمضي باستمرار خارج إطار القانون, بالإضافة إلى حملات الترحيل القسري للشماليين الذي يعملون في مناطق جنوب اليمن وخصوصًا عدن.

تدير القوات الإماراتية سبعة سجون في جنوب اليمن، يعذب فيها العشرات بشكل مهين وتُنتزع منهم اعترافات بالإكراه تفيد بأنهم أعضاء في تنظيمي القاعدة والدولة الاسلامية باليمن.

أحد الذين كانوا معتقلين قال: ((يسمح لنا الذهاب مرة واحدة في اليوم لدورة المياه، كما لا يسمح لنا بممارسة شعائرنا الدينية, وارغموني على تسجيل اعتراف كاذب بأني عضو في القاعدة بعدما تلقيتُ تعذيبًا مبرحًا)).

كثير من العائلات لا تعرف ما هو مصير أبنائها المحتجزين خارج إطار القانون في سجون جنوب اليمن التي تديرها سلطة الرئيس هادي, والسبعة السجون التي تديرها القوات الإماراتية. والسؤال الذي علينا أن نسأل ضمائرنا هو: "من يكترث لمصير هؤلاء!؟"

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Between Hirak, Hadi, and foreign forces, uncertainty reigns in Aden

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The following piece was sent to us by a frequent guest blogger, who writes anonymously for professional reasons and safety concerns. The perspective of the author does not necessarily represent the positions of the YPP. The YPP's Hannah Porter assisted with editing and translation. Yemen’s internationally-recognized government and its allies—including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, local Yemeni salafi groups, and factions of al-Hirak (the Southern independence movement)—are trying to make real progress on the ground in the areas of southern Yemen they have retaken, although this appears to be an impossible task given the complex challenges facing them.

Granting the management and security of Yemen’s temporary capital Aden to the armed faction of al-Hirak led by Aydroos al-Zabidi (who was previously the chairperson of the Hatem movement) was an extremely clever move, one that may have been a result of President Hadi’s foresight into to Aden’s future. Hirak’s field leaders are experiencing a phase of infighting and disorder. After some of the leaders accepted administrative positions in the Hadi-Bahah government, they proved themselves unable to provide solutions to the people who supported them and listened to their speeches about reestablishing the southern nation.

This may be understandable, as the Hirak field leaders have nothing in the way of experience in governance or societal management, and the treasury of Yemen’s government is practically empty. The funding that the government talks about consists of bonds given to them by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf countries. It is true that a small amount of the money has been received, but the larger monetary influx comes as part of the war effort, which drains everything and is itself one of the biggest challenges to normalizing life in Aden.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have set their focus on security challenges in reclaimed areas, as well as promoting military operations against Ansar Allah (Houthi) and pro-Saleh forces. This means that development and normalizing life in the capital of Aden is a matter left to international and Gulf aid organizations, and to the Hirak leadership, which presides over Aden.

International and Gulf aid organizations active in liberated areas have discussed the difficulty of development occurring while security challenges disrupt normal life in Aden. Not only have assassinations increased since Hirak took charge of Aden’s security and administration (with Aden’s governor being subject to three assassination attempts since taking office) but Islamic State affiliates in Yemen have unleashed a tsunami of merciless attacks.

The utter incompetence that pervades Yemen’s government is one of its main challenges. The president and his vice president/prime minister cannot travel through Aden by private cars or even in convoys, but instead resort to helicopters to transport them to their destinations.

Even the services provided to citizens by the Southern Resistance in reclaimed areas are in decline after an initial period of relative stability. Sewage and garbage have begun to fill the streets of Shaykh Othman, al-Mansurah, and Dar Saʻad. Phone and Internet service is still weak and electric outages now last eight hours every day. Water threatens to be cut off due to the administration’s inability to pay their employees’ wages and petrol will sometimes be available for two weeks and then disappear for the next two weeks.

All the above-mentioned challenges may seem normal for areas recovering from armed conflict and still belonging to a country at war. However, these challenges can be used and manipulated as tools to remove an opposing power from the political scene. The search for improvement in current times is a difficult matter and there is nothing the people can do but be patient and hopeful.

تحاول الحكومة المعترف بها من قبل الأمم المتحدة ومن خلفها السعودية و الإمارات العربية المتحدة بالإضافة الى بعض قادة الحراك الجنوبي وايضاً سلفيي اليمن إنجاز تقدم حقيقي على الارض في المحافظات المسيطر عليها، إلا ان ذلك يبدو كمهمة مستحيلة امام التحديات المعقدة التي تواجههم.

إن إسناد ملف إدارة وأمن العاصمة المؤقته لليمن "عدن" لفصيل الحراك الجنوبي المسلح بقيادة "عيدروس الزبيدي" الذي كان فيما سبق يرأس حركة حتم "حركة تقرير المصير"، امر بالغ في الذكاء ! بالإمكان القول ان الرئيس هادي استخدمها وهو يتطلع الى مرحلة ما بعد ما تعيشه عدن حالياً.

إن القيادات الميدانية للحراك الجنوبي تعيش مرحلة من الإصطدام البيني و التوهان، فبعد ان قبل بعض قيادة الحراك الجنوبي بمناصب ادارية في السلطة الحالية للحكومة اليمنية قدمهم كعاجزين عن تقديم اي حلول للجماهير التي لطالما ايدتهم و انصتت الى حديثهم عن إستعادة الدولة الجنوبية.

وفي الحقيقية يمكن تفهم ذلك، فهؤلاء القادة الميدانيين لديهم لاشيء فيما يتعلق بالحوكمة وإدارة المجتمعات، بالإضافة الى ان الخزنة المالية للحكومة المعترف بها تقريباً لا شيء ! فالتمويلات التي تتحدث عنها الحكومة المعترف بها هي تعهدات قدمتها العربية السعودية و دولة الامارات العربية المتحدة وبعض الدول الخليجية، صحيح ان القليل جداً وصل الا ان التدفق المالي الاكبر يأتي للمجهود الحربي الذي يستنزف كل شيء وهو بذاته اكبر التحديات في تطبيع الحياة بعدن.

إن السعودية و الإمارات العربية المتحدة يضعون نصب اعينهم مسئلة التحدي الأمني في المناطق المسيطر عليها و تعزيز العمليات العسكرية ضد قوات انصار الله/صالح. وذلك يعني ان التنمية وتطبيع الحياة في العاصمة عدن ملف ترك لبعض المنظمات الدولية والخليجية بالإضافة الى قيادة الحراك الجنوبي المسلح التي اصبح على رأس السلطة في عدن.

والحقيقة التي تتحدث عنها المنظمات الدولية والخليجية العاملة في المناطق المحررة هي ان لا يمكن للتنمية ان تتقدم والتحديات الامنية تعصف بتطبيع الحياة في عدن، فعمليات الاغتيالات هي في إزدياد منذ تولي الحراك المسلح إدارة وامن عدن، بل وان الدولة الإسلامية في اليمن اطلقت تسونامي يضرب الجميع دون رحمة. فمحافظ عدن الحالي تعرض لـ 3 محاولات اغتيال منذ تولية حكم عدن !

العجز التام الذي يطبق على الحكومة اليمنية المعترف بها هو ايضاً احد التحديات، فكلاً من رئيس الجمهورية و ونأئب الرئيس رئيس الوزراء لايمكنهما التجوال في عدن بسيارتهم الخاصة او حتى بموكب ! عوضاً عن ذلك هم يتنقلون بطائرات هيلوكبتر للوصول الى بعض الاماكن !

حتى الخدمات المقدمة للمواطنين في المناطق المسيطر عليها من قبل المقاومة الجنوبية هي في تدهور بعد ان شهدت بعضها نوع من الاستقرار النسبي، فالمجاري والقمامة اصبح تملئ بعض المديريات كالشيخ عثمان والمنصورة ودار سعد. كما ان خدمة الإتصالات ما تزال رديئة كما الانترنت. الكهرباء التي اصبحت تنقطع لحوالي 8 ساعات يومياً والمياة التي اصبحت مهددة بالتوقف لعدم قدرة المؤسسة عن دفع رواتب العاملين. ايضاً البترول الذي يظهر لمدة اسبوعين ويختفي مرة اخرى لمدة اسبوعين !

إن هذه التحديات قد تبدو طبيعية لمناطق خرجت من النزاعات المسلحة وما تزال تعيش حالة حرب مستمرة في البلد الذي تنتمي له. وهي ايضاً ادوات تمسك بها القوة المتصارعة وتلعب بها بذكاء من اجل ازاحة اطراف من المشهد السياسي. إن البحث عن تحسن في الوقت الحالي امر صعب جداً وليس امام الناس إلا الصبر و الأمل.

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Cooperation between Jihadis and Resistance raises questions for the South's future

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We're pleased to present another guest post by a contributor we've featured on this blog twice before. The author, who is posting anonymously for professional reasons, is a resident of ‘Aden. I have edited the English version of this post for clarity. Our guest posts do not necessarily reflect the positions of the YPP. On July 17, Yemeni Vice President and Prime Minister of the government in exile, Khaled Bahah, announced the “liberation” of Aden from the control of Ansar Allah and the elements of Yemen’s armed forces loyal to former president ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh (mainly the former Central Security Forces and Republican guard).   

There is another side to the truth, neglected in official announcements but visible in reports from the ground. Behind the successful defense of Aden from pro-Saleh/Houthi forces was a collection of three kinds of active armed groups: youth inspired by the Southern independence movement (al-Hirak), Safali militants, and members of Ansar al-Shariʻah (AAS) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) [editor’s note: some observers and foreign governments consider Ansar al-Shariʻah to be an alias or subsidiary of AQAP, but others insist that the two organizations maintain distinct identities.].

Each of these groups has its own headquarters and training sites. One fighter who was active on the Salah al-Din front in al-Burayqah Directorate of Aden said, “I don’t understand why the local media neglected to credit Ansar al-Shariʻah and al-Qaeda with the victory in Ras ‘Amran [Village, west of al-Burayqah]. This is not fair!”

The important role of AAS, AQAP, and the Salafi militias are well known to local leaders, media, and civilians, but most avoid speaking about this openly, in order to avoid confusion or disagreements which could harm the fight against the Houthi/Saleh forces. It is also commonly known that one of the prominent commanders of the local resistance who was killed during the liberation of Ras ‘Amran, Muhammad Harbaj, was a member of AAS.

Forces loyal to Yemen’s legitimate government [i.e. President Hadi’s government in exile] have been the weakest link in Aden. Though these forces have indeed participated in battles on all fronts, they are less prepared and less well-trained than other militias. One example of this is the pro-Hadi forces’ failure to properly take advantage of weapons air-dropped in Aden by the Saudi-led coalition. The reason for this failure is that these forces, like the Hiraki youth and Salafi militias, lack the experience and knowledge to properly use and maintain the American-made weapons provided. AAS and AQAP were better prepared to use such weapons, given their groups’ exposure to US weapons in Iraq and Afghanistan, while the other militias are only familiar with Russian-style equipment.

The pro-Hadi forces also had less of a concrete reason to fight the Houthi-Saleh coalition. For example, Salafi militants sought revenge against the Houthis for the conflict in Dammaj [in Saʻdah, from which Ansar Allah forcibly expelled residents affiliated with a prominent Salafi institution]; AAS and AQAP are fighting to survive; Hiraki youth, for their part, are fighting for the cause of an independent Southern state. Pro-Hadi fighters, on the other hand, were encouraged to fight with promises of payments in Saudi Riyals and 40 liters of fuel from Aden’s refinery, which they could then sell on the black market.

The question of the moment is, what comes after the reconquest of Aden? Some of the most pressing concerns for Adenis include the reconstruction of roads, the restoration of electricity and water supplies, and the resettlement of the thousands of people who were displaced from the districts of Crater, Khor Maksar, al-Maʻala and al-Tawahi. Similar problems face the neighboring governorates of Lahj, al-Dhaliʻ, and Shabwah; there is also the matter of how authorities can compensate citizens affected by the conflict.

Perhaps even more important than these issues is the challenge of counterterrorism. Whatever authority comes to power in Aden will have to reckon with several armed Islamist groups, all of which have proved themselves in the battle for Aden, and all of which continue to be involved in the fight against the Houthi/Saleh forces.

For more on the uneasy alliance between AQAP and other Southern factions, read this piece by renowned Yemeni journalist Saeed al-Batati.

 

في تاريخ يوليو 17، 2015 اعلن نائب الرئيس و رئيس الوزراء اليمني "خالد بحاح" عن "تحرير عدن" من تقدم انصار الله المدعومة من القوات الموالية من الجيش (أمن مركزي و حرس جمهوري) للرئيس اليمني السابق علي عبدالله صالح.

للحقيقة جانب أخر من خلال المقال سنحاول التعرف عليه... يعود فضل عدم سقوط عدن بيد قوات تحالف انصار الله وصالح الى مزيج من مليشيات ثلاث مكونات فاعله بالوقت الحالي "شباب متأثر بأدبيات الحراك الجنوبي، السلفيين ، انصار الشريعة و القاعدة" جميعها تشاركت جبهات القتال ضد مد تحالف انصار الله  وصالح.

فكلاً من المليشيات الثلاث كانت لها غرفة العمليات الخاصة بها والتي منها تدريب مواقها في جبهات القتال، يتحدث احد المشاركين في جبهة قتال منطقة صلاح الدين التابعة لمديرية البريقة " استغرب عدم تناول الإعلام المحلي لحقيقة انتصار انصار الشريعة والقاعدة في جبهة عمران، إن ذلك غير منصف !".

رغم علم الكثير من الشخصيات الاجتماعية و وسائل الإعلام وحتى العامة من الناس للدور المهم الذي يلعبه انصار الشريعة و القاعدة بالإضافة إلى السلفيين إلا انهم يتجنبون الحديث صراحة الاعتراف بذلك الدور علناً تفادياً للتشويش الذي قد ينتج على المعارك ضد تقدم تحالف انصار الله وصالح. فقائد اللجان الشعبية لمنطقة صلاح الدين الذي قتل اثناء تحرير منطقة رأس عمران ويدعى "محمد حرباج" احد اعضاء انصار الشريعة في عدن.

القوات التابعة للشرعية في عدن هي "الحلقة الأضعف"، صحيح انها شاركت ايضاُ في جبهات القتال إلا ان جهودها ببقية المليشيات المسلحة المشاركة معها فإنها تعتبر الأقل جاهزية للقتال، فعلى سبيل المثال الاسلحة الامريكية التي قدمت من قبل قوات التحالف السعودي لإستخدامها ضد تقدم انصار اللخ و صالح لم يستفاد منها بالشكل الكافي ! والسبب يعود بأن القوات التابعة للشرعية بالإضافة إلى المليشية المتأثرة بأدبيات الحراك الجنوبي بالإضافة إلى السلفيين لا يملكون المعرفة الكافية لإستخدام ذلك العتاد العسكري الأمريكي خلاف انصار الشريعة و القاعدة الذين يملكون معرفة ممتازة بإستخدام العتاد العسكري الأمريكي والذي عدد من عناصر القاعدة تمكنت من إستخدامة في افغانستان و العراق. خلاف بقية المليشيات المسلحة التي تملك خبره جيدة بإستخدام العتاد العسكري الروسي فقط !

النقطة الأخرى، بقية المليشيات المسلحة التي قاتلك مع القوات التابعة للشرعية عندما قاتلك فإن اسبابها اكثر صلابها فعلى سبيل المثال السلفيين يقاتلون إنتقاماً "لحرب دماج" بينما انصار الشريعة والقاعدة التي تقاتل كي تبقى واخيراً المليشية المتأثرة بأدبيات الحراك الجنوبي فإن سبب قتالها إستعادة ما تعتقد انه إستعادة الدولة الجنوبية".

خلاف القوات التابعة للشرعية التي تقاتل لأجل مجموعة من الريالات السعودية و 40 لتر بترول ممنوح من مصافي عدن ليتم بيعة لاحقاً بالسوق السوداء !

السؤال المستحق في هذه اللحظة، ماذا بعد استعادة عدن !؟

إعادة إعمار عدن ويشمل ذلك البنية التحية من طرقات وكهرباء وماء ... و عودة النازحين الى بيوتهم التي تركوها في مديريات كريتر، خورمكسر، المعلا و التواهي.

بالإضافة إلى إعادة إعمار المحافظات الاخرى المتأثرة بالصراع المسلح كلحج، الضالع و شبوة وتعويض المواطنين عما فقدوه.

والأهم من ما سبق... قضايا مكافحة الإرهاب الذي بلا شك سيكون الملف الأبرز وهنا سيكون التحدي اكبر لأن الجماعات الاسلامية قد اثبتت وجودها في معركة عدن وماتزال تعيش نزوة الانتصار بعدما كانت سبب ايضاً في صمود واستعادة عدن !

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An in-depth look at the factions of al-Hirak

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Following his excellent post on the al-'Arudh Square protest encampment, our guest blogger returns with an in-depth look at the different factions involved in southern Yemen’s independence movement, commonly known as al-Hirak. The author, who is posting anonymously for professional reasons, is a resident of ‘Aden. I have edited the English version of this post for clarity. Our guest posts do not necessarily reflect the positions of the YPP. The day of November 30, 2014—which Hirak leaders hyped for weeks as a day of definitive revolutionary action—has passed, and it seems it did not meet with the desires and wishes of many of the protesters in the ongoing sit-in in Khor Maksar district. Especially disappointed were the many who expect the day to be a historical turning point in the struggle of Hirak.

Despite the anticlimax of November 30, southerners continue to join the ranks of al-Hirak’s several factions. Though nearly all Hirakis are united in their demands for independence, there are significant factional differences within the movement.

The factions of al-Hirak can be grouped into three umbrella categories:

  1. Factions with a non-religious orientation,
  2. Factions with a religious orientation,
  3. Factions with a solely militant orientation.

Factions with a non-religious orientation

The most influential of the non-religiously oriented factions include:

The Supreme Council of the Revolutionary Movement for the Peaceful Liberation and Independence of the South This important group contains two sub-factions with even more cumbersome names: the Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South, and the Supreme Council of the Southern Revolution for Liberation and Independence. The first of these is commonly referred to as the Ba‘um Faction, as its members follow the prominent Hadhrami activist Hassan Baʻum, while the second is known as the al-Baydh Faction, after the self-proclaimed president of South Yemen, ‘Ali Salim al-Baydh. The split between the two factions came in September 2012; more recently, fear of losing popular support to competing factions has pushed the Baʻum and al-Baydh Factions closer together.

The League of the Free Sons of South Arabia/the Preparatory Committee of the General Southern Conference The South Arabian League, founded in 1951, was one of the oldest political parties in the Arabian Peninsula. Shortly after its founding, the United Kingdom (which controlled southern Yemen until 1967) expelled the party’s leadership from Aden. In 1989 ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jifri established a breakaway faction called the League of the Sons of Yemen (RAY). Further schisms within the RAY included the establishment of the Path Correction Party by ‘Umar al-Jifri.

Recently, the League launched a prominent initiative called the Southern Comprehensive Conference, which aims to unite a number of Hirak factions in a common front for the sake of communicating with the outside world.

National Conference of the Southern People/Southern National Council for Salvation Formed by Muhammad ‘Ali Ahmad, a politician from Abyan, after his return to the country in 2012, this faction has support from a number of prominent Adeni families and individuals. These include the Bashrahil family, which owns al-Ayam newspaper, Radiyah Shamshir, and Yasin Makkawi, in addition to a number of Hadhrami politicians and tribal leaders. The faction also received support from Ahmad bin Farid al-Surimah, a wealthy businessman from Shabwah who holds Omani nationality.

Following the decision of other southern leaders—including the expatriate leaders who participated in the 2012 Cairo Conference—to boycott Yemen’s post-revolutionary National Dialogue Conference, Muhammad ‘Ali Ahmad’s NCSP took up the seats in the Conference allocated to al-Hirak. However, controversy over the group’s participation in the National Dialogue led to internal divisions, as al-Surimah withdrew financial support, and several of the faction’s delegates to the NDC pulled out during the latter days of the Conference.

Currently, the National Conference of the Southern People counts on Muhammad ‘Ali Ahmad's relations and contacts, as well as the limit media support which is still provided by al-Ayam newspaper and the Bashrahil family.

More recently, Muhammad ‘Ali Ahmad launched the Southern National Council for Salvation in yet another attempt to unite various factions and constituencies. The project has not accomplished much, though the threat of another major center of power within Hirak encouraged the al-Baydh and Baʻum factions to reunite, as noted above.

The First Southern Conference/Cairo Conference Held in Cairo on November 20-22, 2011, this conference brought together a number of prominent southern leaders, some of whom had been living in exile. Those in attendance included former PDRY presidents ‘Ali Nassir Muhammad and, in addition to Muhammad ‘Ali Ahmad.

At the end of Cairo Conference, the former president ʻAli Nassir Muhammad was elected to be the chairperson, with Haydar al-ʻAttas elected as first deputy, and Salih Ahmad Ubayd as second deputy.

The Cairo Conference could be considered an elitist grouping, and it has no real control over those working on the ground in southern Yemen.

Factions with a Religious Orientation

Lawfulness (Sharʻiah) Committee This group consists of religious leaders, most of whom are moderate Salafis or jihadi Salafis. Some members of this faction were involved in the recruitment of southern young men for the jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and some are involved in the mobilization and funding of Ansar al-Shariʻah, a militant movement affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Committee members have claimed the exclusive right to speak at Hiraki Friday prayer services. The location of such Friday prayers are announced by local Hirak leaders in various areas. The estimated numbers of attendees in each place of religious gathering is between 30 to 1,000 people.

Islamic Awakening (al-Nahdah) Movement This Salafi-oriented movement uses humanitarian relief and charity as a way to expand its work and attract new members. It works mainly in remote rural areas, far from the civic center of the provinces.

Al-Nahdah is active throughout southern Yemen, though its founder, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rab al-Salami, is from Yafiʻ.

Islah Party/Muslim Brotherhood Before the entrance of Ansar Allah/the Huthi Movement into Yemen’s capital, the Islah Party, which includes members of the Muslim Brotherhood, had a very important role to play in southern Yemen and in particular the provinces of Aden and Hadhramawt. But this role completely disappeared after the departure of both Hamid al-Ahmar and General ‘Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, who fled Yemen in the face of the Huthi advance.

A large number of Islah party leaders in southern Yemen have met in Aden, and rumors have circulated about their intention to create a new political faction called the Southern Platform Party. Moreover, a number of Islah Party leaders in the south have announced their support for the right of self-determination and secession, which is strange as it was well known that Islah Party members previously espoused unity between north and south.

Ansar al-Shariʻah The armed group known as Ansar al-Shariʻah is generally considered an affiliate of AQAP, though there is an increasing affinity within the movement toward the Islamic State/ISIS. The group has been based mainly in the south since its establishment, and a large number of its members are from the south. Recently, though, its operations in the south have slowed, and its focus has shifted to combatting Huthi expansion in areas like al-Baydha and Ibb.

The Militant Orientation

The Southern Security and Military Council The creation of the Southern Security and Military Council could be understood as a “third generation" of activism by former members of the PDRY army and security forces. The forced retirement without pay of these men was one of the original drivers of the Southern Movement. The military retirees first formed associations in 2007. The military commander Nassir al-Nubah, from Shabwah, is the real founder of this trend.

The formation of Southern Security and Military Council at Aden’s Coral Hotel on September 19, 2014, astonished many observers, who interpreted the move as an explicit declaration of armed resistance to the “Yemeni Occupation.”

According to statements by one of the Council’s commanders, the main aim of the Council is to fill the gap in security that will result from the eventual withdrawal of Yemeni security forces. But this raises the question of whether the Council really has the manpower and materiel required for such a task, especially given the presence of other armed groups in parts of the south.

The Council’s leader, Muhammad Qassim Tamah, is one of its main strengths. It is important to note that he is a former southern military commander from Yafiʻ. His tribal connections in Yafiʻ mean that he has significant human and material resources. However, most of the members of the Council are relatively old, and their influence is largely limited to the Yafiʻ region.

[Editor's note: As one reader pointed out, it's not really accurate to list Ansar al-Shari'ah as a faction of al-Hirak. However, some elements of AAS and AQAP have, in the past, explicitly supported the call for southern independence, and according to our blogger there are financial and personal connections between some official Hirak members and AAS. I also think it's important to remember that while the first generation of al-Qaeda in Yemen was explicitly anti-socialist and opposed to the PDRY regime, AAS emerged in the post-Hirak south, and many of its members identify with southern nationalism, even though southern nationalism is closely tied to the legacy of the PDRY. Finally, if all of this factionalism reminds you of this scene from Monty Python's Life of Brian, you're not alone.]

في عمق الحراك...

مضى يوم الـ 30 نوفمبر، 2014 ويبدو انه لم يتوافق مع رغبات الكثير من المعتصمين في الساحة او ممن توقعوا لهذا اليوم إحداث "منعطف تاريخي" في مسيرة الحراك السلمي الجنوبي. وذلك يبدو محبط للكثيرين من الجنوبيين الذين ينضمون يوماً بعد يوماً للقوى الجنوبية المنضوية تحت مظلة الحراك الذي يطلب "فك الارتباط" و "استعادة دولة جمهورية اليمن الديموقراطية الشعبية" شريك "الجمهورية العربية اليمنية" في عام مايو 22، 1990  .

ترتكز تلك المظلة المسماة "بالحراك الجنوبي" على ثلاثة اعمدة وهم:

  1. مجموعات دون توجه ديني
  2. مجموعات ذات توجه ديني اسلامي
  3. المجلس الجنوبي الأمني و العسكري "التوجة القتالي"

اولاً: مجموعات دون التوجه الديني

يمكن جمع كل المكونات الجنوبية المنضوية تحت مظلة "الحراك الجنوبي" والتي لا تتبنى كهدف اساسي في نشاطها "توجه ديني" في بوتقة واحدة حيث تتنوع تلك المكونات فمنها على سبيل الذكر "مجموعة الاكاديميين الجنوبيين" و " المجلس الاعلى للحراك الثوري السلمي لتحرير واستقلال الجنوب" بالإضافة "لمؤتمر القاهرة" ... إلخ

نتناول اهم تلك المجموعات كالتالي:

  1. المجلس الاعلى للحراك الثوري السلمي لتحرير واستقلال الجنوب

يتكون من فصيلين اثنين وهما: المجلس الاعلى للحراك السلمي لتحرير الجنوب "تيار باعوم" و المجلس الاعلى للثورة الجنوبية للتحرير و الاستقلال "تيار البيض" حيث ان في الاساس يعد المكون واحد لولا اختلاف وجهات النظر ادت في انشقاق فيه بما اصطلع على تسميته "تيار باعوم" و "تيار البيض" وحصل ذلك في تاريخ سبتمبر 7، 2012م .

في الواقع، ان اعادة التئام المكونان جاء كما يتحدث احد المراقبون بسبب خوف مشروع مؤتمر شعب الجنوب المتمثل في " مجلس الانقاذ الوطني الجنوبي" خوفاً من خسار كلا المكونين للتأيد و الزخم الشعبي الذاني يحضيان به و تحول التأييد الشعبي الى  "مجلس الانقاذ الوطني الجنوبي" .

  1. رابطة ابناء الجنوب العربي الحر – اللجنة التحضرية للمؤتمر الجنوبي الجامع

يعد حزب "رابطة الجنوب العربي" من اقدم الاحزاب على الساحة اليمنية وشبه الجزيرة العربية حيث تأسس في عام 1951م حيث قامت بريطانيا بنفي قادته للخارج، تلى ذلك عمليات انشقاق للحزب تزعمه السيد "عبدالرحمن الجفري" وسمي تياره المنشق "رابطة ابناء اليمن (رأي)" في عام 1989م.

شهد الحزب ايام عصيبه اثر محاولة تقسيمه من خلال خروج جزء من قيادته وتأسيس حزب سياسي منه سمي "حزب رابطة تصحيح المسار" يقيادة عمر الجفري.

من ابرز مبادرات حزب رابطة ابناء الجنوب العربي الحر بقيادة "عبدالرحمن الجفري" مبادرة المؤتمر الجنوبي الجامع والذي تهدف للخروج بحامل سياسي يضمن فيه اكبر عدد ممكن من المجموعات الجنوبية امام العالم.

  1. المؤتمر الوطني لشعب الجنوب – المجلس الوطني الجنوبي للإنقاذ

بعدما عاد محمد علي احمد وهو احد السياسيين الجنوبيين نفوذاً في ابين تحديداً وبعض مناطق الجنوب، و ربما بعيداً عن مؤتمر القاهرة الذي كان احد اهم الذين حضروه وجد ضالته بتأسيس كيان جنوبي اخر اسماه "المؤتمر الوطني لشعب الجنوب" بتاريخ ديسمبر 16 -18، 2012 بعدن.

اعتمد محمد علي احمد بشكل رئيسي على استيعاب الرموز العدنية في مكونه السياسي مثل "صحيفة الايام متمثلة بأسرة باشراحيل" و "رضية شمشمير" و "ياسين مكاوي" بالأضافة الى بعض سياسيين حضرموت وقبائلها كما لا ننسى إستقطاب احد اكبر رئوس الاموال الجنوبية الخارجية متمثلاً برجل الاعمال احمد بن فريد الصريمة الذي يحمل الجنسية العمانية ويعود بالأصل إلى محافظة شبوه.

ويمكن ان نجد تفسير لخروجة عن إجماع مؤتمر القاهرة وتأسيسة لمكون "المؤتمر الوطني لشعب الجنوب" حيث شارك لاحقاً بمكونة في جلسات مؤتمر الحوار الوطني ! وخلال مؤتمر الحوار الوطني شهد المؤتمر الوطني لشعب الجنوب محطات مثيرة تمثلت بخروج حليفة المالي من المكون وهو رجل الاعمال "احمد بن فريد الصريمة". كما خروج ومقاطعته للجلسات النهائية لمؤتمر الحوار الوطني حيث تم استنساخ مشاركة المكون في مؤتمر الحوار الوطني وخروج عدد من حلفائة وعلى رأسهم "ياسين مكاوي - عدن" و "العقيد خالد باراس – حضرموت" .

في الوقت الراهن يرتكز بشكل رئيسي "المؤتمر الوطني لشعب الجنوب" على محمد علي احمد بالإضافة إلى الدعم الإعلامي المحدود الذي ما تزال اسرة باشراحيل صاحبة صحيفة الأيام تقدمه له.

و ربما يمكن الحديث ان مبادرة مجلس الانقاذ الجنوبي الذي طرحها محمد علي احمد التي تفاعل معها عدد من المكونات الجنوبية لكنها سرعان ما تجمدت ! يعود لها الفضل بشكل غير مباشر بدفع كلاً من تيار باعوم و تيار البيض إلى إعادة التوحد في محاولة منها لمواجهة المشروع الذاني نجحى حقاً الى حد كبير فيه تجميده و الحفاظ على مناصريهم في الساحة الشعبية الجنوبية التي كانت تطالب القيادات الجنوبية بالتوحد.

  1. المؤتمر الجنوبي الأول "مؤتمر القاهرة"

تكمن اهمية المؤتمر الجنوبي الأول المعروف بإسم "مؤتمر القاهرة" كونه أول اجتماع جنوبي شمل عدد كبير من السياسيين و النشطاء الجنوبيين في الداخل والخارج وهو الذي انعقد في القاهرة بتاريخ نوفمبر 20 – 22، 2011، وممن حضروا هذا المؤتمر الرئيس السابق علي ناصر محمد، و السيد حيد العطاس بالإضافة إلى محمد علي احمد .

وقد تم انتخاب كلاً من الرئيس الاسبق علي ناصر كرئيس للمؤتمر الجنوبي الأول بالاضافة الى نائبين له وهما حيدر ابوبكر العطاس "نائب اول و صالح عبيد احمد كنائب ثاني.

والحقيقة ان مكون "مؤتمر القاهرة" هو في الاساس نخبوي ليس له فعل حقيقي على الأرض حيث يعتمد بدرجة رئيسية على برجماتية و الحنكة السياسية التي يصف المراقبون بها كلاً من علي ناصر و حيدر العطاس.

ثانياً: مجموعات ذات توجه ديني اسلامي

هناك المجامع ذات الايدولوجية الاسلامية وهي بطبيعة الحال تتكون الي:

  1. الهيئة الشرعية

تتكون من مجموعة من المدنيين الاسلاميين ذات التوجه السلفي المعتدل و السلفي الجهادي ولبعض الافراد المنتسبين للهيئة الشرعية تاريخ يرتبط بدور مهم إبان فتره تجنيد الشباب في جنوب اليمن للمشاركة في ما سمي بالجهاد ضد القوات الروسية في افغانستان، بالإضافة للمشاركة في الحشد المالي و الدعوي كما الاستقصائي لصالح المجموعة المسلحة المدعوة "انصار الشريعة" .

للهيئة الشرعية الحديث حصراً يوم صلاة الجمعة حيث يجتمع عدد كبير جداً من المصلين في تجمعات محلية تحددها قوى الحراك الجنوبي كلاً في منطقته حيث يتراوح عدد الحضور في تلك التجمعات الدينية ما بين 30 – 1000 شخص في جميع مناطق جنوب اليمن.

  1. حركة النهضة السلفية

وهي حركة اسلامية ذات توجه سلفي تتخد من العمل الاغاثي و الانساني وسيلتها للتمدد و استقطاب اعضاء ومناصرين جدد لها. ويلاحظ عليها انها تركز في انتشارها على العمق الريفي البعيد عن مركز المدني للمحافظة حيث تعمل في جميع المحافظات الجنوبية. ويعتبر مؤسسها الشيخ عبدالرب السلامي الذي ينتمي جغرافياً الى منطقة يافع .

 

  1. 3. حزب الاصلاح "الاخوان المسلمين

في سبق دخول انصار الله للعاصمة اليمنية "صنعاء" كان لحزب الاصلاح اليمني "اخوان المسلمين في اليمن" دور غايه في الاهمية في جنوب اليمن وعلى وجه الخصوص محافظات عدن و حضرموت. لكن ذلك الدور اختفى تماماً بعد خروج كلاً حميد الاحمر و الجنرال علي محسن الاحمر خارج اليمن ليتبدل ليصبح الدور الذي يلعبه حزب الاصلاح في جنوب اليمن بالمنتهي !

فقد اجتمع عدد كبير من قيادات حزب الاصلاح في جنوب اليمن في عدن ويقال عنه توجه جديد لهم للضهور مجدداً في المشهد السياسي الجنوبي لكن بإسم اخر يدعى "حزب المنبر الجنوبي"، كما واصبح الموقف السياسي لأعضاء حزب الاصلاح في جنوب اليمن داعمين لحق الجنوبين في حق تقرير المصير بل ان بعض قيادات حزب الاصلاح في عدن تحدث صراحة عن دعمة لفك ارتباط جنوب اليمن ! ويأتي هذا الموقع المستجد من حزب الاصلاح بعد ان كان اعضاءه سابقاً احد اهم الداعمين لإستمرار الوحدة الاندماجية بين جمهورية اليمن الديموقراطية الشعبية و الجمهورية العربية اليمنية.

  1. انصار الشريعة

تعتبر المجموعة الاسلامية المسلحة المدعوة "انصار الشريعة" احد الاذرع المحلية التي تدين بالولاء بشكل متزايد الى "الدولة الاسلامية" وما يزال جزء لا بأس منه ما يزال يحتفظ بالولاء لتنظيم القاعدة بقيادة "ايمن الظواهري".

يتواجد جزء كبير من عناصر و مناصرين انصار الشريعة في الوسط اليمني و عدد لا بأس منه في جنوب اليمن.  ومؤخراً تكاد تكون عمليات انصار الشريعة في جنوب اليمن "شبه متوقفة" حيث تركز بشكل متزايد لمقاومة التمدد الجغرافية لأنصار الله للوسط الأمني. تأخد المقاومة شكل "حرب كر وفر مفتوحة" في كلاً من محافظة البيضاء و إب. حيث تغدى تلك الجبهات بدعم من عناصر انصار الشريعة الموجودة في الجنوب.

ثالثاً: المجلس الجنوبي الامني و العسكري "التوجة القتالي":

إن تأسيس "المجلس الجنوبي الأمني و العسكري" يمكن فهمة بأنة "الجيل الثالث" من التطور الأمني و العسكري الذي يصنعه المتقاعدون  قسراً العسكريون و الامنيون الذي كانوا فيما سبق المحرك الرئيس للجيش الجنوبي المندثر حيث لاحقاً وفي عام 2007 شرع المتقاعدون قسراً العسكريون و الامنيون بتشكيل جمعيات سميت "بجمعيات العسكرين و الامنيين" ويعد القائد العسكري "ناصر النوبة" الذي تعود اصوله لمحافظة شبوه احد اهم الفاعلين فيها !

لقد شكل تأسيس المجلس الجنوبي الامني و العسكري في فندق كورال في مدينة عدن بتاريخ سبتمبر 19، 2014  إندهاش عدد من المراقبين حيث ما يزال لا يفهم كيف يتم تأسيس مجلس امني وعسكري يناهض الجمهورية اليمنية ويدعو صراحة للمقاومة ما اسماها "قوات الاحتلال اليمنية" جهاراً دون خشية من اي تبعات مثل هذه الخطوة التصعيدية الامنية و العسكرية !

وبناء على حديث احد قادة المجلس فإن دورة الرئيسي يكمن بسد فراغ اي تراجع للقوات الامنية و العسكرية التابعة للدولة اليمنية في جنوب اليمن، وهنا يبدو السؤال مشروعاً عن "العدد البشري و العتاد العسكري الذي يملكه هذا المكون ومدى انتشاره في المساحة الجغرافية الجنوبية  في ظل وجود مجموعات مسلحة اخرى !؟"

في الحقيقة، احد اهم نقاط القوه في المجلس الجنوبي الامني و العسكري هي رأسه المجلس المتمثلة ب"محمد قاسم طماح" وهو قائد عسكري جنوبي من منطقة يافع القبلية وهذا يعني ان سيتلقى دعم قبلي مالي وبشري بالاضافة لكون جميع المؤسسين لهذا المكون العسكري هم في الاساس من كان يوماً في قوات الامن و الجيش الجنوبي المندثر !

إلا ان اهم نقاط ضعفة ان نسبه المنتسبين له هم من كبار السن ! وهم المشكلين للفئة العظمى حيث ان التمثيل الشبابي يكاد يكون "غير موجود" كما ان المساحة الجغرافية التي يتواجد فيها هذا المكون تكاد تكون مقتصره على مناطق صغيرة جدا في يافع فقط ! بالإضافة ما يزال غير واضح مدى العتاد العسكري الذي يملكه المكون والذي يرجح ان يكون ايضاً بسيط وبدائي !

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The View from Khor Maksar: Fog on the Horizon

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We're pleased to present a guest post on the current situation in Khor Maksar District of 'Aden, where southern activists have occupied a public square. The author, who is posting anonymously for professional reasons, is a resident of 'Aden. This is our first bilingual blog post; the Arabic version has not been edited. Guest posts do not necessarily represent the position of the YPP or its staff. It has been approximately seventeen days since the first tents were installed on al-‘Arudh Square, in Khor Maksar district of ‘Aden, which has become the revolutionary square for all who demand the restoration of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).

Al-‘Arudh Square sit-in is a unique and exciting experience, and an important phenomenon for all Southern factions, in addition to the powers in the North and certainly the regional and international players. The sit-in has drawn a large number of revolutionaries coming from different areas of southern Yemen: protesters from Lahj, Abyan, Shabwah, al-Dhali‘, a few from ‘Aden, and fewer still from Hadhramawt. So far there is no representation in the sit-in from al-Mahrah, Soqotra, or the other southern islands.

Today al-‘Arudh Square sit-in is shaping the contours of the southern state tomorrow. It is true that the largest proportion of the protestors are from the Yafi‘ area, which is divided between Abyan and Lahj governorates the next largest constituency is from al-Dhali‘.

The Shari‘ah Committee and the Islamic-Salafi trend are the groups controlling the al-‘Arudh Square sit-in, in terms of management and receiving donations, roles from which the liberal and socialist factions are completely absent. Judging from the current moment, it seems the Salafi trend will be very prominent in the future of South Yemen, based on its ability to manage and resolve a number of issues and its monopolizing of Friday prayers in the Square.

As of the moment of writing this report, no tent in the Square carries the name of a southern governorate, but a large number of tents carry the names of tribes, villages and prominent families. What does this mean? This trend sends the message that there are many local players preparing for the next stage, and suggests the southern governorates could fragment along tribal or other lines as these local players work to impose their own agendas.

The absence of tents representing particular governorates—for example, an “‘Aden tent” that might contain activists from local Hirak, Islah, GPC, and socialist groups—is a major shortcoming of the current sit-in. Such gatherings would allow for discussion of mutual concerns between different groups and the formation of stronger links between them. At present, no such discussions are taking place.

Protesters have spent more than two weeks in al-‘Arudh Square sit-in without a having serious discussions about the escalatory steps the movement should take after the November 30 deadline they've announced. Nor are they having debates about the future of southern Yemen or the role of southern leaders.

It would be bad for the larger southern movement, if the southern leaders were restricted to discussing those issues outside the sit-in among themselves, away from the protesters, leaving them to an unknown destiny.

In addition to all the above, there is still a conflict within the Southern Movement between those who support the idea of a Yemeni federal republic made up of two regions--North and South--in which southerners would have the right of self-determination and a referendum on independence after 5 years, and those who want immediate secession. The conflict between these two trends has reached its peak.

Both parts are trying to gain support from the protesters in al-‘Arudh Square sit-in, as well as to seek control of the sit-in. Immediately after Shaykh Husayn bin Shu‘ayb, a federalist, was selected to manage the sit-in, the protesters were surprised by another announcement from those who want immediate secession announcing the name of Shalal ‘Ali Sha‘i—a Hirak leader from al-Dhali‘—as administrator of the sit-in.

Such actions firmly entrench this intra-southern division, and even call to mind the old factional conflict between “al-Tughmah” (representing Yafi‘, al-Dhali‘, and Lahj) and “al-Zumrah” (Abyan and Shabwah), but reenacted by contemporary southerners living in different circumstances.*

Although there are good initiatives from southern groups, such as the initiative of 33 group in al-‘Arudh Square sit-in, these still pale in comparison to the vast amount of challenges, which are made by the Southern leaders and their factions. The current moment is really critical, and requires dialogue and partnership in making a common future…but the future of southern Yemen is far from clear yet.

*Editor’s note: The author is referring here to a conflict that emerged in the 1980s between different factions within the Yemeni Socialist Party, which ruled the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen at the time. Al-Zumrah and al-Tughmah refer to the factions loyal to ‘Ali Nasir Muhammad and ‘Abd al-Fattah Ismail respectively. In January 1986, a brief and bloody civil war erupted between the two. ‘Ali Nasir and his supporters (al-Zumrah) eventually fled to North Yemen, while ‘Ali Salim al-Beidh—the most senior surviving member of ‘Abd al-Fattah’s al-Tughmah faction—took control of the PDRY.

جنوب اليمن... افق غير واضح

سبعة عشر يوماً تقريباً منذ ان وضعت الخيام في ساحة العروض بمديرية خورمكسر وتحولها إلى ساحة ثورية لجميع ثوار جنوب اليمن المطالبين لإستعادة دولة جمهورية اليمن الديموقراطية الشعبية.

يشكل مخيم ساحة العروض تجربه فريدة... مثيرة و مهمة ايضاً لجميع المكونات الجنوبية بالاضافة إلى قوى الشمال وبالتأكيد اللاعبين الإقليميين و الدوليين. فمخيم الاعتصام هو المكان الذي يجتمع فيه عدد كبير من الثوار القادمين من مناطق مختلفة من جنوب اليمن، معتصمين من عدن،لحج،ابين،شبوه،الضالع و قليل جداً من حضرموت! ولا تمثيل حتى الان في ساحة الاعتصام للمهرة و سقطرى وبقية الجزر الجنوبية!

إن ساحة الإعتصام اليوم تشكل ملامح دولة الغد التي يتحدث عنها الجنوبيين. صحيح ان النسبة الاكبر من الحضور هم لأبناء منطقة يافع التي تقع بين محافظتي ابين و لحج بالاضافة إلى ابناء الضالع إلا ان ثمة حضور مقبول لبقية المحافظات المذكورة في ساحة الاعتصام.

الهيئة الشرعية و القوى الاسلامية ذات الاتجاه السلفي هي المسيطرة على إدارة ساحة الإعتصام وإستلام التبرعات المالية و المعنوية مصاحب لذلك دور غائب تماماً للقوى الليبرالية وحتى الاشتراكية ! فيما يبدو ان اللحظة الراهنة تريد ان تخبرنا ان مستقبل جنوب اليمن سيكون من نصيب القوى الاسلامية ذات الاتجاه السلفي التي اظهرت حتى الان قدرتها على الإدارة وحل عدد من القضايا مما يدفع بالمواطن في جنوب اليمن للثقة بشكل متزايد بتلك القوى يوماً بعد يوم خصوصاً انها من يحتكر حديث يوم الجمعة ايضاً.

إلى لحظة كتابة هذا التقرير لا يوجد خيام بأسماء المحافظات الجنوبية ! بل مجموعة كبيرة من الخيام بأسماء القبائل و القرى و العائلات الجنوبية، فماذا يعني ذلك.

إن غياب خيمة المحافظة الجنوبية الجامعة واستبدالها بخيمات تتبع قبائل، قرى و عائلات جنوبية يرسل لنا رسالة مفادها ان ثمة لاعبين محليين كثر يستعدون للمرحلة المقبلة وذلك يعني ان المحافظات قد تشهد تشضي نتيجة الصراع الذي سيأتي بين اللاعبين القادمين من قبائل وقرى و عائلات المحافظة الواحدة والتي سيتصارعون فيما بينهم في سبيل فرض اجنده معينه.

إن غياب خيمة المحافظة الجامعة كسبيل المثال، خيمة عدن التي يجتمع فيها: الناشط الحراكي، الاصلاحي الجنوبي، الاشتراكي الجنوبي، المؤتمري الجنوبي... إلخ جميعاً يتحدثون فيما بينهم حول هموم محافظتهم وتذوب حواجز الماضي لتتشكل فيما بعد رابط اقوى يجمعهم معاً هو اكثر الامور تعقيداً وتحدياً لمخيم الاعتصام اليوم.

أن ذهاب الوقت الذي يمضيه المعتصمين في ساحة الأعتصام دون نقاش جاد حول مستقبل الخطوات التصعيدية و مستقبل جنوب اليمن تديرة النخب الجنوبية يعد خسارة كبيرة اولاً.

وثانياً بالإمكان ان يكون انانية و إحتكار بل وتضليل إذا ما تم إقتصار مناقشة تلك المسائل خارج المخيم بين القيادات الجنوبية فقط بعيداً عن المعتصمين في ساحة الاعتصام تاركينهم لمصير مجهول.

علاوة على كل ما سبق، ما يزال الصراع بين اولئك الذين يؤيدون دولة يمنية من اقليمين جنوبي وشمالي مع حق تقرير المصير بعد 5 سنوات للجنوبيين . و فك الارتباط المباشر قد وصل الى اوجه هذه الاثناء.

فكلا الفريقين يحاول ان يحضى بالتأييد الاكبر في ساحة الاعتصام كما يسعى إلى السيطرة على إدارة شئون مخيم الاعتصام ففي الوقت الذي تم فيه إختيار الشيخ حسين بن شعيب لأدارة مخيم الاعتصام تفاجئ المعتصمون في الساحة ببيان اخر من قوى فك الارتباط المباشر تتحدث عن إختيارها لشلال علي شائع من محافظة الضالع كمدير لشئون مخيم الاعتصام بخورمكسر عدن ! إن مثل ذلك الفعل يرسخ  بقوة للأنقسام الجنوبي بل ولا ابالغ ان قلت بأنه يستدعي صراع الماضي بين الطغمة (يافع/لحج و الضالع) و الزمرة (ابين وشبوة) ولكن هذه المرة بشخصيات معاصرة و ضروف مختلفة.

ومع ان ثمة مبادرات جيدة من بعض المجاميع الجنوبية كمجموعة ال 33 لساحة الاعتصام الا ان ذلك ما يزال ضعيف امام الكم الهائل من التحديات التي يصنعها قادة المكونات الجنوبية فيما بينهم.

ان اللحظة الحالية حرجة وتتطلب حوار ولقاءات وشراكة في صنع المستقبل المشترك... لكن في جنوب اليمن يبدو بأن افق مستقبل هذه الرقعة الجغرافية غير واضح.

An 'Aden Emergency

Throughout the day yesterday the news from 'Aden got worse and worse. Security forces raided private homes and arrested two prominent Hirak activists. Police fired on demonstrators in Khormaksar. Tensions were growing ahead of planned demonstrations by Islahis celebrating the anniversary of president Hadi's "election" and Hirakis denouncing it. Finally, security forces fired on a convoy of Hirakis from Abyan and Shabwah that included Hirak leader Hassan Ba 'Oum. This last event, and the subsequent arrival in 'Aden of said convoy of now-enraged separatists, seems to have been the turning point; certain members of the Technical Committee for the National Dialogue Conference withdrew from the committee, and its chairman, Dr. al-Iryani, suspended the committee and asked the president for a urgent meeting, according to reports. Meanwhile, residents and militants in Dhale‘, near the old north-south border, have been preparing for another round of war with government forces. Farther east, youths in al-Mukalla threw stones at and attacked the shops of northern merchants.

Few of these events are totally new, but this week there seems to be something in the air. According to some sources, last week's Security Council resolution, which named 'Ali al-Beidh as a spoiler of the transition right alongside 'Ali Saleh, angered southerners and gave al-Beidh's popularity a major boost. Some Hirakis seem intent on forcing a confrontation, while increased brutality on the part of the state seems to be pushing the various rival factions of al-Hirak together. Moreover it feels, to me at least, that there is a fixed point looming ahead and near at hand. Of course the planned start date of the NDC is less than a month away, but no one really expects it to start on time (nevertheless, people realize that it can't be put off indefinitely). There's something bigger, some reason which to me feels like a law of nature, that makes a much larger and more dire state of conflict in the south seem inevitable. Again, I can't really support this with facts, and maybe tomorrow will feel different. There were similar days and feelings during the height of the protest in 2011, like the next day would bring something big, something terrible, but nothing came of it.

What I can say for sure is this: things aren't getting better in the south, and no one in 'Aden or San‘a has anything close to a workable plan for how to make them better. The international community has virtually ignored the southern issue, willing it to go away on its own. Besides, everyone from Ban Ki-Moon to Barack Obama to Vladimir Putin has made it clear that if the world is going to solve a civil war this year, it's going to have to be Syria's. As far as the world is concerned, war in Yemen is not an option. So if the worst happens, Yemenis will be on their own.

What would a real civil war look like today? Very little like the war of 1994, which ended with clear victory for northern forces and the Saleh regime. Not like the insurrection against the British in the 1960s, either. In the former, Saleh had three-fourths of a regular army, plus tribal allies and Jihadi irregulars to enforce his will. In the latter, the British, though ultimately defeated, had the supply lines and wealth of a empire. President Hadi has an empty treasury, a divided military, and is, politically speaking, surrounded by jackals.

The southern side would also look very different than it did in 1994. Though Hiraki militias have grown to be quite organized (in theory, anyway) in certain places, that is not the case everywhere. But if war breaks out in 'Aden, the real question will be how all of the other armed factions in Yemen respond. How will AQAP get involved? What will Ahmad 'Ali Saleh and his cousin Yahya do? What will 'Ali Muhsin do? The Huthis? The tribes surrounding San‘a that were so brutally punished during 2011?

Bottom line: if Aden breaks into open armed rebellion, the rest of the south is likely to as well. If that happens, armed groups throughout Yemen--including elements of the military--will take advantage of the situation. A civil war in today's Yemen could fracture the nation in a dozen ways. It's impossible to predict who would come out on top, but the southern people and Hadi's government would be sure losers.

It's morning in 'Aden now, and heavy, continuous gunfire is reported in Khormaksar District and Sirah/Crater as well. More violence is certain; little else is.

Talking about the south

Earlier today someone commented on the YPP Facebook page that the YPP isn't doing anything to highlight or address the "southern issue." I think this is not quite true, but I thought I'd take a minute to write about the subject in the hopes of fostering a public discussion here on the blog. First, what exactly is the "southern issue"? It depends who you ask. If you ask a representative of the central government, for instance, he might tell you about the "lawlessness" and violence that pervades some parts of the south, and the refusal of southern activists and political leaders to participate in the transition process.

If you ask your average southerner, she or he will probably tell you that southerners have been systematically disenfranchised ever since unification in 1990, and that a peaceful protest movement that began in 2007 has been violently repressed since its very first sit-in. He or she would probably also mention the 1994 civil war, in which northern forces destroyed the southern army and sacked the southern capital, 'Aden, and other cities. Many southerners will also say that the south has been "occupied" ever since 1994, and that the Saleh regime and its inner circle of northern shaykhs, generals, and businessmen systematically stole southern land and wealth in the early years of unification. An increasing number of southerns will go on to tell you that they are, in fact, not Yemenis at all. They prefer to be called South Yemenis or South Arabians, and they demand complete independence for the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

If you were to ask me about the southern issue, I'd probably mention some of the same things as our hypothetical southerner above. I'd tell you that the government's response to southern activism since 2007 has been excessively violent and militarized. I would note that, in today's transitional, post-revolutionary Yemen, government forces would hardly dare to attack protesters in San‘a or Ta‘iz (although some government agencies still hold political prisoners from the revolution), but those same forces don't hesitate to bully, beat, or fire upon demonstrators in the south. I would also mention that although both the new president and prime minister are from the south, the current central government has done nothing to demonstrate good faith or otherwise address the demands of southerners in a constructive fashion.

But there's more to the issue than just a conflict between north and south, or between pro-independence activists and the central government. Southern secessionists are divided among themselves. There are several different political leaders who claim to speak for the south (or specific parts of the south), and even more ground-level factions that mount demonstrations and even armed attacks on government assets. And of course, there are plenty of southerners who aren't asking for independence. Some support the idea of a federal state with strong local government, and others want to see southern grievances addressed in the context of a new, unified, revolutionary republic. And yes, there are southerners who support neither independence nor the revolution (not a popular thing to say, but it's certainly true).

Personally, I believe that self-determination is an inalienable right for all people. That said, if the southern governorates were to declare independence today, the results would not be good for anyone in Yemen (except the arms dealers). I think some kind of progress on the nation-wide transition and stabilization process must be achieved before any serious talk about dividing Yemen into smaller states. I think a successful, peaceful, equal southern Yemen--independent or not--can only come about if the various factions and political leaders of the southern region can find a way to work together under a democratic framework (something they've never managed to do before, it must be said.

Now that I've said my piece, I very much want to hear what other people have to say. How do you see the "southern issue"? What do you think the government can do about it? What do you think about independence or federalism, and do you think either of these things is actually feasible? How can northern citizens help create a more positive political atmosphere? What should outside powers and the international community be doing with regards to the south? What should non-governmental organizations and foreign activists like us be doing? Please let us hear your opinions. Thanks!

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Two big questions

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While I work on a couple of long, detailed blog posts—one on the tactics and messaging strategies of AQAP and Ansar al-Shari`ah, and one on why President Hadi might want to take a page out of his predecessor's playbook—I needed to take a minute and flesh out two questions that keep coming up in my interactions on Twitter, but are too big to easily tackle in that format. I don't have answers to either of these questions, so I would love it if readers would offer their thoughts, either here in the comments or on Twitter.

Big Question Number One:

AQAP and Ansar al-Shari`ah: are they one and the same? Most serious analysts and specialists who know a lot about Yemen and/or al-Qa`idah believe that they are. More specifically, they accept the explanation that AQAP itself has offered, that Ansar al-Shari`ah (AAS) is simply a new brand name that AQAP operatives use when they think the al-Qa`idah name might not go over well with locals. This is the interpretation Gregory Johnsen, Aaron Zelin, and Will McCants—three very smart analysts I tend to agree with—accept, and it's the one presented on last week's PBS Frontline special. That program reached a much broader audience than usually pays attention to news from Yemen.

But there are others who don't accept this easy explanation of the relationship between AAS and AQAP. Wall Street Journal correspondent Ellen Knickmeyer has been very vocal, on Twitter at least, in insisting that locals in Abyan view the two organizations as separate and distinct. Knickmeyer claims that "a sizeable number of researchers currently working in Yemen" understand the two to be distinct, although she became inexplicably hostile and refused to talk to me when I tried to discuss this with her on Twitter. Another San`a-based American analyst whom I respect a great deal told me recently that AQAP's leadership has no direct relationship to AAS, and that AAS was originally, according to his sources, made up primarily of mercenaries, though it's not clear exactly to whom they answered.

The two groups still maintain separate media operations. As I'll explain in more detail in an upcoming post, I think that the messaging and media of the two groups tells us a good deal about their relationship. Most importantly, no one in the "AAS and AQAP are the same" camp has yet presented a detailed explanation of the whole operational structure of the unified organization. If AAS is just a marketing campaign, we have to understand how AQAP has been able, in just one year, to transform from a rather small network of militants primarily focused on carrying out bombings and other small operations to a quasi-state entity, capable of commanding a small army and governing whole towns.

Big Question Number Two:

Who really controls armed groups associated with Islah and the Southern Movement in 'Aden and elsewhere in the south? A few minutes ago I had the following interaction with Tweeter Haykal Bafana` after tweeting a story from the Yemen Post about new recruits in the Yemeni army firing at the Defense Minister's car:

[View the story "New Story" on Storify]

This conversation reminded me of another one I had last week with tweeter Amel Ahmed about recent fighting between armed men identified as members of the Southern Movement (al-Hirak) and others identified as Islahi gunmen. Now, it's commonly understood that al-Hirak is not a unitary group with a single, central leadership. So it's very hard to know whom we're talking about when we use phrases like "Hiraki gunmen" or "southern separatist fighters." A recent story in the Guardian explained how some Southern Movement factions are seeking support from/being courted by foreign powers or other factions, including Iran and AQAP. So it's always important to ask, when clashes involving "separatists" are reported in 'Aden, Hadhramawt, or elsewhere in the south, who exactly these separatists are, and who commands, supports, or arms them.

Likewise, it's not clear (at least to me) who the so-called Islah party gunmen are in 'Aden (or in Abyan, as per Haykal's assertion above). Most analysts will tell you that party membership has never been the primary mode of identification, or the primary loyalty, of most Yemenis. Party ranks below family and tribe for most people. But in the past year there have been fighters described as "Islahi" involved in conflicts in al-Jawf, San`a, Arhab, `Aden, and now Abyan. So who are these fighters, and who commands them? Should we assume that all of these groups are in fact commanded and paid by the Islah party leadership? Of course, Islah has never been a perfectly unified entity either, so who among the leading figures in the party is responsible for these militias? Hamid al-Ahmar? 'Abd al-Majid al-Zindani?

As armed groups continue to proliferate throughout Yemen, and as the United States becomes increasingly involved in the Yemeni state's fights against some of these groups, those of us who seek to understand Yemeni affairs need to do a better job of understanding and explaining the issues raised above.

*********** Update: The first response to this post came via Twitter. I can't post Storify pieces in the comments section, so I'll add it here:

[View the story "New Story" on Storify]

Urgent appeal for Abyan

The plight of the people of Abyan Governorate, which lies along the southern coast of Yemen north-east of 'Aden, has been under-reported of late. In May the US media leaped at the story that al-Qa‘idah fighters had captured the provincial capital of Zinjibar, because the US media will print anything that has to do with al-Qa‘idah. But save an excellent piece last week in the LA Times, coverage of the growing humanitarian crisis in Abyan has been almost non-existant. I don't blame the press, or anyone else, really, for this oversight. It's very, very difficult to get reliable information from San‘a and Ta‘iz--Yemen's most accessible cities--these days, even for those of us who spend most of our time trying to do exactly that. Aden and Abyan haven't seen a foreign journalist since February, as far as I know, and have much lower internet penetration than those other parts of the country. It's no one's fault that we can't get up-to-the minute news about the thousands of people fleeing ongoing fighting between militants and security forces in Abyan. But thanks to the work of dedicated Yemeni activists, we do have some concrete information, and now that we have it, we have to do something about it.

We know this:

  • Low-intensity warfare continues, not just in Zinjibar but throughout Abyan. Casualties can't be counted; more horrifying, casualties can't even be collected. The sparse reports that get out say that bodies are lying in the streets, feeding the ubiquitous southern crows. Amateur footage that I'm not going to link to here shows the bodies of soldiers, charred and obliterated, beside the blackened wrecks of armored vehicles. Civilian casualties, and those of the anti-government militants, are certainly more extensive.
  • At least 30,000 civilians have fled Abyan for Lahj and 'Aden. Many have been taken in by friends and relatives; others are squatting or camping out on the road.
  • At least one formal IDP camp has been established in Khormaksar District, 'Aden. YPP is in touch with a well-known activist and volunteer in 'Aden, who has personally visited the camp and transmitted to us a camp census and list of needs.
  • The Khormaksar camp holds at present 1,342 people, of which 124 are under the age of three and 441 are under the age of fifteen.

Our contact in 'Aden, who heads a foundation called House of Light, is prepared to begin purchasing supplies from a list given him by the camp managers. Items include basic foodstuffs, diapers, clothes, and medicines. We at YPP have pledged our support to House of Light for this purpose. We are calling on all of our friends and readers to help us fund the operations of the Khormaksar camp by sending donations to YPP or shopping at our Revolution Webstore (all proceeds go directly to Yemen).

We will provide updates and further details on the situation in Abyan as they become available.

One final note: official US policy has always been to support the Saleh regime's violent repression of all protest movements in the south, as these might possibly be aligned with AQAP. As the current violence in Abyan is directly linked to AQAP, we can expect the United States to be absolutely silent, even on the humanitarian dimension. Go ahead, Secretary Clinton, prove me wrong.

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San‘a Bulletin #2

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We have received an update on the situation in San‘a and elsewhere in Yemen from the same friend we featured in an earlier guest-post. This friend would like to remain anonymous, but we can say that this person is a well-known Western scholar with a long background in Yemeni studies. We are fortunate to have a chance to share this person's observations with our audience. It should be stated, however, that the following does not necessarily reflect the opinions of the YPP. Amidst all the chaos developing this past week here in Yemen I thought it be good to have a talk with a good friend, or two, in order to catch up on events and personalities driving protests from Aden to Taiz and Sana’a.  The main reason for wanting to write this is to provide a more clear perspective on events that still remain outside media’s grasp and yet much of the information we read is based on speculation by analysts outside Yemen.

Since my last conversation with AJ, peaceful protests which were the primary tactic by youth organizing outside political institutions using Facebook and other social media, have escalated to brutal confrontations between pro-change demonstrators and pro-government thugs that cannot be called counter protesters.  Since protests in Sana’a on 3 February’s Day of Rage, which spread to areas like Dhamar where protests were led by local Islahi shaykhs, we have witnessed protests led not by political parties, but by the spontaneous initiative of a number of young students in cities like Aden, Taiz and Sana’a. Much still remains unclear as to how students organized in order to draw such large numbers as we’ve seen in Aden and Taiz.  Protests in Sana’a still remain relatively small, larger than initial gatherings in front of Sana’a University after 3 February but much smaller than the 3 February demonstration organized by the JMP.

Protests in Aden and Taiz are becoming the center of the anti-government movement for a number of reasons.  The case of Aden remains extremely unique, while it is the heart of the South it had remained beyond core activity by the Southern Movement, whose activity since 2007 focused on Abyan, al-Dhalea, Lahj, and Shebwa.  Activity in Aden instantly escalated to violent confrontations primarily because of the strategic value.  Government forces have a strong presence to safeguard the city from the Southern Movement’s sphere of influence.  This is the primary reason for why the government reacted immediately with special forces against the protesters, since it could not mobilize public support through political parties. The city has been a long standing stronghold for al-Islah and the GPC is unable to gather enough support is such short notice. Most of the protestors remain university students who were mobilized after the first death during protests this past week.

Taiz, on the other hand should not surprise observers. As it was acknowledged this week by members of al-majlis taghlef qabail mareb wa al-jawf this has been the historic center for reform movements, and while education levels are higher than other regions, unemployment among youth is extremely high.  The Tribal Council from Mareb and al-Jawf also released a statement this week apologizing for racist insults from government elements against people of Taiz, calling them ‘burghulis’ (see Mareb Press article), and this shows the importance given to the city by tribal elements.  People began to flock to the area of Tahrir (Taiz) and the Noor Mosque in the Huraysh St/Jammal Abdul Nasser St intersection (in old Safer area) during day and night.  Friends in Taiz spoke of people spending the night in the area while many women supplied them with food and water.  This Friday witnessed the largest crowd of pro-change protesters to date, while pro-government numbers remained a fraction.  Again, although the president had just visited the city to rally support for his constitutional amendments leading up to the now postponed elections, the GPC does not maintain strong popular support, so he had to react with overwhelming military presence to contain the protests.  As we see to date, it has failed and protests continue and grow in numbers by the day.  The grenade incident on Saturday 18 February definitely escalated the situation and has allowed the organizers to attract more people to protests.

In Sana’a the situation deterorates daily, the number of pro-government elements grows to counter the otherwise peaceful gatherings.  Here is where we actually see the politcs of the regime at play, and showing its uglier side.  Protests this week have escalated to direct confrontations between protesters, young and old, and pro-government ‘hooligans’ sent to the streets to intimidate activists and their followers.  Tahrir Square continues occupied by tribal elements paid by authorities to prevent pro-change protesters from entering the symbolic city center.  All pro-change protests have been contained to the area between the Old and New Sana’a University campuses.  The confrontation have been attributed to personalities such as Abd al-Rahman al-Akwa (Mayor of Sana’a), Hafed Ma’yeed and Arif Azuka (Security), who are said to be responsible for paying the hooligans confronting peaceful protestors.  This shows how the strategy to contain the protests moved beyond Saleh’s hands, and his nephiews Yahya M. Saleh (Central Security) and Amr M. Saleh (National Security), whose forces were primary during the government’s response since 3 February.  All security forces in Sana’a are a combination of Public Sesurity and Central Security elements charged with containing the area of the protests.

In Sana’a the situation also involved the first political casualty, Dr Khalid Tamim (Pres. of University of Sana’a).  There are two versions to the story.  On the one hand, young activists indicated he was fired because he failed to allow a number of buses from entering the campus to transport students to a meeting with President Saleh.  The student association in Sana’s in associated with al-Islah party, but the relationship with Tamim was not contentious to the point were he would have obstructed their access to President Saleh.  The other version says that miscommunication between Tamim and the presidnet’s office led to Tamim’s suspicion certain elements in the regime planned to arrest the students under the pretense of a meeting with Saleh.  Some believe that based on a lack of communication or mistrust of sources informing him of the meeting, ie. Azuka, al-Akwa or Ma’yed, Tamim aimed to protect the students.  Either way the president thought he needed to be removed and replaced by Saleh Ba’Sadrah (Hadhramawt).  While Tamim’s removal was known by Wednesday afternoon, no official media source made it public, even two days after Mareb Press reported on the changes.

The political situation within the regime may develop along the lines of family and in-laws.  Before the protests began in Aden and Taiz with the current numbers, it was said that Saleh would begin a reshuffle that would have alianeted some of his in-laws within the government.  The family, controlling the military and economy, would not see much reshuffle, but the many in-laws within families like Arhabi, Akwa and others would have lost some posts, giving way to Islahis and Socialists as reward for engaging Dialogue.  It seems these in-laws either really want to hang on to their posts by making huge mistakes in trying to show Saleh he still needs them, or the in-laws are trying to make him and the family look worse in order to increase opposition and create chaos within the regime.  If he does not step in immediately and stop the hooligans, I doubt the tribesmen in Tahrir will be able to deter a violent revolution that as people here begin to say, will lead to a civil war.

Ba‘d al-yawm...

...Crowds were celebrating in the streets, as indeed they were in all Yemen's major towns. The concrete-filled barrels at check-points on the border between North and South had been rolled away and crowds chanted ba‘d al-yawm ma ‘ad baramil, after today, no more barrels!

Those lines come from the anthropologist/historian Paul Dresch's description of Yemen's Unification Day, May 22, 1990. I thought of this description one night back in July when, driving past the President's Mosque in San‘a, it occurred to me that there are far more "barrels" in Yemen today than there were before unification.

A single militarized border between two states has been replaced by a heavily militarized single state, militarized not against outside enemies but against its own citizens. Today in Yemen, no one can drive from one city to another without stopping at multiple checkpoints. Inside the cities, police and Federal Security forces are omnipresent.

Today the news and the Tweet-o-sphere were full of reports of the tremendous success of the Gulf Cup Tournament in Aden. I should know, as I contributed to Yemen's PR victory by noting these stories on the YPP's own Twitter feed and Facebook page (and again here, just now). Of course, Yemen deserves a bit of good news, and a bit of positive coverage in the world media. As I noted on Facebook, this was the first time I've ever heard a non-Yemeni Arab say anything positive about Yemen. But the narrative of these cheerful stories is a bit sad, and very revealing. Most of the articles revolve around two points:

  • Yemen hosted an international event and nothing got blown up;
  • security was overwhelming, but everyone had a great time.

The underlying assumptions are that there would have been terrorist attacks at the tournament had the government not provided adequate security, and that, to put it simply, the South is crazy and unsafe without thousands of soldiers all over it. The conclusion that a rational reader would draw, then, is that an overwhelming and "proactive" domestic security posture (or, in South Yemeni dialect, an occupation) is totally justified and a good thing for everyone involved. Just look how much fun those Saudi tourists are having! And hey, what was the threat that all of those soldiers were protecting us from, anyway? Al-Qa‘idah? Secessionists? Most foreign reporters don't know, and didn't bother to find out.

A few happy stories about football might do a lot to legitimize the central government's repressive policies towards the South. What President Saleh wants, after all, is to associate the Southern Movement with AQAP in the minds of his allies. By depicting an amorphous danger in the south and crediting the government with defending people against it, the press has helped him accomplish this goal. His security measures—which have repeatedly failed to defeat actual threats—have been congratulated and welcomed by the international community, while southerners who complain of northern aggression have been discredited.

After today, more and more barrels.